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Democratizing the police in Europe

with a particular emphasis
on Greece

transform!

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ΙΝΣΤΙΤΟΥΤΟ
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The current crises throughout Europe, the entrenchment of neoliberalism and the reassertion of authoritarian austerity today are indeed bleak developments. But within each crisis is the burgeoning possibility and potential for new ideas. Much of our work has been influenced by our active interaction with a group of scholars loosely associated under “Anti-security” which aims at a safer and more

fulfilling future by advancing critiques and alternatives from contemporary orders of surveillance, and military and policing programs aimed at the forcible reassertion of capitalist relations through pacification. We thank them for providing us the intellectual foundations to attempt such an undertaking. We hope we have contributed to an ongoing dialogue about the potential for such a future.

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Executive summary

Over the past 20 years the aggressive reassertion of neoliberalism, the renewal and expansion of repressive state capacities and the effort of the establishment to contain growing popular unrest in the wake of the current financial crisis has resulted in an inevitable escalation of conflict between the Left and policing organizations throughout Europe. These developments raise serious questions about the evolving nature, direction and intensification of police coercion. The current conjuncture has also produced the very real possibility of electoral majorities by progressive Left parties on the heels of wider popular mobilizations. This necessitates reflection on the possibility of progressive police reform as part of a strategy of the Left, whether in opposition or in government.

What complicates this task is that, despite considerable advances in Leftist and Marxist state theory, the police remain the least theorized and understood state institution among the Left. Undoubtedly, the practical experience of the police role in political struggles has forced the Left into a reactive and instrumentalist theoretical stance according to which the police merely dispense coercion on behalf of the ruling class and must therefore be challenged unambiguously on every possible occasion. The grave political implications of this stance are not limited to a self-perpetuating a state of mutual suspicion and hostility, but they also compromise the Left's ability to address consistently and persuasively questions of policing, law and order. In short, this stance stifles the Left's ability to build a dialogue about the future and proffer a vision of a post-capitalist policing system that is safer and more democratic.

Various political audiences that are potentially open to the political message of the Left and are key to its electoral success are unwilling to endorse a negative view of the police role that offers no vision of order and public safety. Working-class citizens rely on the police for the performance of critical peacekeeping functions in everyday life. The irony is that the Left, by being confined to a form of permanent opposition against the practices of the

really existing police end up reifying and reinforcing paramilitarised police bureaucracies and missing the connection between the bourgeois notion of police science in capitalist society that subtends the entire global economic system. We argue that the Left should interrogate and seek to replace this bourgeois understanding of police in a democratic transition to socialism. In fact, we would argue that the Left ought to make public safety the centre of their strategy to wrest the police mechanism from the effective control of the interests of the capitalist class.

'Police science' as a broad vision of social order had been a key preoccupation of bourgeois intellectuals throughout the period of the emergence of capitalist social relations. So much so, that we can say that it ought to be considered the foundational science of capitalism parallel in significance and meaning to political economy. The issue for such intellectuals as William Petty, Nicolas Delamare, Patrick Colqhoun or even Adam Smith was, from the beginning, how to forge a social order conducive to capitalist economic growth and the pacification of the newly disenfranchised and increasingly unruly subordinate populations during the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 'Police' in this sense had been a much wider concept, at once applying to collective welfare, an ordered political body and the forging of a productive labour force.

In short, early and classical bourgeois thought developed a police science intended to support a process of pacification within the contours of capitalist social organization. Even though the concept of police was subsequently narrowed down to denote a particular type of bureaucracy, the broader projects of fabricating a social order conducive to capitalist production and consumption still underpin the dominant discourse on security. 'Security' today is hegemonic precisely because it encompasses visions and strategies pertaining to the reproduction of capitalist social relations in their entirety. In the same way that bourgeois police science once fabricated a new order for the transition to capitalism, the challenge for the Left is to build a new understanding of security that represents nothing less than a police

system that facilitates a transition to a new democratic social and economic order—to think through a socialist police science.

As in all complex organizations, dissent and political ruptures are present within police organizations. In the present context of austerity, fiscal constraints and privatisation an opportunity exists to undercut the historic alliance between the police and the Right, in so far as neoliberalism systematically undermines the very notion of public good which the police are employed and sworn to uphold. A prerequisite for the successful pursuit of this opportunity is to acknowledge police labour and develop strategies and policies empowering the police as worker: a successful strategy for the progressive reform of the police does not merely consist on besieging the police mechanism from outside by introducing elements of democratic oversight and control, but also to democratize the division of labour and the systems of work within the police organization. The same applies *par excellence* to corporate security where, we suggest, the most precarious and alienated forms of policing labour exist today.

While we emphasize that Left strategies for policing reform will depend on the particular characteristics of the national context in each case, we propose six general tenets encompassing the prioritisation of security as public good, of social fairness, integrity and democratic control. A Left strategy for police reform should seek to:

1. **Reframe public safety:** the police today have an extremely wide mandate that encompasses a variety of tasks ranging from everyday peacekeeping to crime control and state security. Nevertheless, the bulk of police services depend heavily on front-line personnel and pertain to upholding the conditions of peaceful social coexistence without recourse to the use of force. At the strategic policy level, the Left must seek to instil in the police mandate the prioritization of public safety above all else - understood as a preoccupation with the minimisation of harmful outcomes in everyday life. This may entail both an intensification of police activity in certain areas of social life, and, importantly a contraction or complete withdrawal from others.
2. **Redefine the police professional:** the Left must pursue a break with established notions of police professionalism which have given rise to the dominant model of police organisation characterised by militarism and bureaucratism. It must force a re-envisioning of the police service bringing the qualities and abilities of police personnel at the forefront and encourage organizational designs and systems of delivery that promote social awareness, expertise, initiative and sound decision-making among police personnel. These should be supported by the development of professional knowledge and standards pertinent to community needs, and by systems of initial and career-long learning and training conforming to and nurturing such knowledge and standards.
3. **Establish a dense network of external controls:** a Left strategy for police reform must actively seek to establish a decentralized system of citizen consultation, oversight and control that will complement the system of legislative and judiciary controls that typically exists under conditions of liberal democracy and which will aim to enhance local responsiveness and accountability of the police. Such a system can involve the establishment of elected police boards at national and local levels. Internal police procedures should also be integrated with this system of external controls so as to offer a higher degree of protection and autonomy to individual police officers.
4. **Implement democratic restructuring:** democratic restructuring of the police organization should generally follow the principles of geographical and administrative decentralization. It should involve a reallocation of police resources towards front-line units responding to community needs and priorities, as well as a strengthening of the ability of front-line personnel to take initiative and formulate effective responses in consultation with communities.
5. **Facilitate citizen participation:** in line with the previous tenet, a Left strategy for police reform should actively explore ways to strengthen and generalize citizen participation in police decision making, and even operations. These participatory structures could involve the introduction of local meetings between police, citizens and other organizations during which formal decisions

about local policing priorities should be made and subsequently reviewed. A further step may involve the introduction of part-time and auxiliary personnel which will be recruited from the local citizenry and will be integrated with police operational units as much as feasible; and,

6. Engage directly with private policing: the Left must acknowledge that even an extensive restructuring and reallocation of public police resources, this may not immediately eliminate a reliance on private security, which is an important and perhaps irreversible characteristic of contemporary policing. The Left should pursue the introduction of a regulatory regime that renders the functions of private security compatible with the principles and priorities of the public police system as they emerge from the preceding tenets—in this respect, there exists a considerable margin for intervention in the structure of private security organizations, encouraging more democratic forms of ownership such as worker-owned security co-operatives, division of labour and accountability.

In the particular case of Greece, a Left strategy for police reform must take into account certain characteristics emanating from the historical development of Hellenic policing in that country. The police in Greece exhibit the traits of a ‘continental’, state-controlled, militarised police bureaucracy (a brief survey of different police models can be found in the Appendix), but these have been relatively hardened due to the close affiliation of the police with the political right and the explicit political role the regimes of the Right in their various manifestations (monarchy, cold war hard-line conservatism or dictatorship) have assigned to the police historically. As a result, acute militarism and bureaucratism have adversely impacted the quality of police service and the relations between the police and the public. The weight of this institutional history continues to encumber progressive reform efforts as they tend to permeate the organization, deployment, methods and attitudes of the police.

In the present conjuncture, the rising influence of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party among the Hellenic Police (as evidenced by the voting behaviour of police and instances of practical cooperation between police and Golden Dawn activists) can be

best understood as a consequence of these historically-rooted characteristics of the police apparatus in Greece.

It follows that a progressive police reform strategy in Greece not only must be more gradualist and carefully formulated, so as to nurture the development of alliances between the political Left and strategic segments within the Hellenic Police, but also in some important respects it must strive to achieve goals that in other advanced liberal democracies are already taken for granted. With the prospect of a government of the Left in mind, we propose a number of steps that could initiate this process. The reform programme should aim to:

- Establish a research and strategic unit guided by a team of experts, with extensive powers to collect, audit, report and share data on police activity and to monitor and evaluate police practice;
- Create a comprehensive and multi-tiered personnel system and database with a view to establishing a system of regular professional development planning and review;
- Establish an updated system of regular mandatory retraining as a distinct component of police academy training;
- Establish an independent National Police Board and bring the Hellenic Police under its immediate control;
- Commission a study for the restructuring and decentralisation of the Hellenic Police, in combination with a wide process of public consultation;
- Remove all paramilitary police units from regular service in everyday policing;
- Revise, harmonise and codify all existing primary and secondary legislation governing police powers;
- Review and revise the system of incentives and rewards applying to serving police personnel and relate it to the outcomes of their professional development planning; and,
- Revise and codify all legislation regarding private security, in accordance with the regulatory principles explained above).

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1.0 Introduction

It may be said that the least theorized and understood state institution among the Left is that of the police. While radical thinkers for some time have grappled with the relative role of the state in a larger political context,¹ the police have generally been viewed within an antagonistic lens based on a long history of struggle and direct experiences with infiltration, provocation, pacification, and the undermining of progressive social movements since at least the mid-1800s. As social movements of the Left have diversified their tactics with some success, policing organizations have similarly implemented more diverse and draconian methods of pacification in response.² The last two decades, in particular, have seen a re-escalation of conflict between the Left and policing organizations in Europe and around the world.

This antagonism, while certainly justified in the context of struggle and resistance has also hampered the Left's ability to produce a fulsome and genuinely analytic understanding of the police.³ As a result, despite advances in more nuanced thinking about the capitalist state and its role in the liberal international order among radical thinkers, a rather instrumental understanding of policing persists.

This lack of theoretical development is particularly disappointing because, as we shall argue, a complete understanding of the capitalist state and the functioning of the capitalist world economy is impossible without grasping the central role policing has played in the fabrication of this global order.

Marx aptly observed in the mid-nineteenth century during the arrival of what we now understand as the first modern Anglo-Saxon constabulary, that “security is the supreme concept of bourgeois society, the concept of police.”⁴ Given developments in the world economic system, the role of Empire in the maintenance of the most elaborate global system of surveillance ever conceived,⁵ and the unabated growth of public and private security forces in tandem with growing inequality⁶, Marx's pronouncements have perhaps never been more salient.

There has, of course, never been a *socialist* police science. The prescriptive formulation of a system of social control for most revolutionaries is unthinkable, even abhorrent. As Harvey has argued, however, “one of the problems with lately lamented communism is that it didn't ask these questions about everyday life.” It did not seriously query “what would a transition out of capitalism to socialism look like?” which, we would agree, “plays a critical role in thinking about any revolutionary process.”⁷ As a consequence, radical democratic governments are unprepared to deal with the police because they have not applied themselves to a seri-

1 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack (London: Verso, 1985), Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 2014., orig. 1980)

2 David Graeber, *Direct Action: An Ethnography* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2009), Nicholas Lamb and George Rigakos, „Pacification through ‚Intelligence‘ During the Toronto G20,” Pp. *The State on Trial: Policing Protest*, eds. Margaret E. Beare and Nathalie Des Rosiers (Vancouver: UBC Press, Forthcoming), Luis. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement*. (Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press, 2008, Luis Fernandez and Christian Scholl, „The Criminalization of Global Protest: The Application of Counter-Insurgency,” Pp. 275-98 *Urban (in)Security: Policing in Neoliberal Times*, eds. Volker Eick and Kendra Briken (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2014).

3 Cyril D. Robinson, „The Deradicalization of the Policeman: A Historical Analysis,” *Crime and Delinquency* Apr. (1978): 129-51.551-5, Robert Reiner, „The Police in the Class Structure,” *British Journal of Law and Society* 5 (1978): 166-84

4 Karl Marx, „On the Jewish Question,” Pp. 26-52 *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2d., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978).

5 A continuously updated “Global Surveillance Disclosures” Wikisite in the aftermath of Edward Snowden's NSA document leaks may be found here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_surveillance_disclosures_%282013%E2%80%93present%29

6 George Rigakos and Aysegul Ergul, „The Pacification of the American Working Class: A Longitudinal Study,” *Socialist Studies* 9.2 (2013): 167-9, George S. Rigakos and Aysegul Ergul, „Policing the Industrial Reserve Army: An International Study,” *Crime, Law and Social Change* 56.4 (2011): 329-71

7 See Harvey's online lectures on Capital, especially *Chapter 15: Machinery and Large-Scale Industry, Sections 1-3* <http://davidharvey.org/2008/08/marxs-capital-class-08/>

ous examination of policing and its potential place in a new participatory economy. In the absence of such examinations the options for a Left governments have seemed to cluster around: (i) ever more liberal-type reforms of institutions of policing; (ii) a clientelist purge and appointment of party-faithful among a new police executive leaving existing structures in place, or worse (iii) the complete subjugation of state policing in the service of some ideologically-driven implementation of an authoritarian Left regime. All three of these options should be unacceptable to the democratic Left. They are manifestations of an impoverished understanding of policing in a capitalist economy and how to go about reshaping its institutions.

The first step for radical Left thinkers, therefore, is coming to grips with the intimate connections between police and capital in the current system.

There is a long political and economic history here that goes to the heart of the formation and administration of the modern liberal state. This bureaucratic history needs to be unpacked and its mythologies examined if the Left is to build a rational democratic formation of police and public safety. The point, of course, is to change the system. We argue that this change is impossible to achieve without a clear understanding of the political economy of policing.

This is the goal of this Report: to lay out how policing and capital have functioned in Europe and internationally and, based on this understanding, to offer some recommendations for discussion for democratizing institutions of policing in keeping with the political and economic ambitions of the democratic Left.

2.0 Police science

“[a]ll the bourgeois economists are aware... that production can be carried on better under the modern police...”

- Karl Marx⁸

The Enlightenment period of the late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries is often considered a period of European ascendancy. Europe blossomed in the midst of devastating state wars, colonial exploitation and imperial expansion. This era also gave rise to what Foucault termed the arrival of “the disciplines” that included modern political philosophy, economic theory and international trade and finance.⁹ These disciplines laid foundations for the economic developments and accompanying scientific and political rationalities

that are now endemic to contemporary ‘western’ civilization. During this time, important debates about the *raison d'état*, the efficiency of bureaucratic systems, and the most economical and ‘scientific’ means of governance took place within the rubric of a *science of police*.

Our approach to “police” in this Report, therefore, entails more than just the uniformed law enforcement functionaries we have now come to identify under that title. We are intentionally invoking a “pre-disciplinary”¹⁰ idea of police “before the police”¹¹ in order to invoke a longer and more embedded interrelationship between police and capital. Such an approach is rare. Typically, the notion of police is presented as a nineteenth cen-

8 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: C.H. Kerr, 1904): Div. I, part I

9 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980)

10 Mark Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police Science“,“ Pp. 17-41 *The New Police Science: Police Power in Domestic and International Governance*, eds. Markus D. Drubber and Mariana Valverde (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 19

11 Lucia Zedner, „Policing before and after the Police: The Historical Antecedents of Contemporary Crime Control“, *British Journal of Criminology* 46.1 (2006): 78-96

tury project doggedly pursued by forward-thinking reformers such as Sir Robert Peel¹² or, to a lesser extent, as a class-based initiative¹³ aimed at the moral and political control of an increasingly unruly urban proletariat. There is considerable truth to both of these approaches and we are certainly very sympathetic to the latter but we also aim to demonstrate policing as a grand intellectual project linked to state formation, prosperity and security in Enlightenment thought. In order to achieve this, therefore, the first order of business is to “[disturb] the obviousness of the present of modern western policing”.¹⁴

To start, the notion of ‘police’ has a peculiar history. It can best be understood as an overarching system of Enlightenment thought that has given birth to a wide range of disciplinary schools ranging from political science to economics and criminology.¹⁵ It is, in a sense, the *foundational science of capitalism*. The earliest planners and political theorists of the capitalist system in the seventeenth century were directly or indirectly “police intellectuals” in that they seamlessly moved from public order and the advocacy of systems of social order to methods by which the economy could be reshaped to establish a capitalist system.¹⁶ This planning was simultaneously aimed at both imperial and domestic projects of pacification that while complex, at core sought to make the population “productive” – which meant fabricating a social order that facilitated the extraction of surplus-value from labour. Indeed, Enlightenment planners were quite explicit about these

projects of pacification and this form of thinking continues to inform international “police actions” to this very day.¹⁷

It is also a peculiarity of this idea of police that while it is etymologically rooted in the Greek words “polis” and “politeia” (which mean the city and civilization) its contemporary use to signify an organized body entrusted with enforcing order is common to almost all countries except Greece itself. Indeed, most of those who invested in the promotion of a police science harkened to its Greek roots in what was a common practice of nostalgizing the classics and, in particular, the idealized Greek city-state during the eighteenth century. Another reason for the direct connection to Hellenic antiquity, particularly among the English police intellectuals was to gloss over its more developed usage on the Continent and, in particular, by the French Physiocrats, from whom the English wanted to distance themselves but whose ideas about order they nonetheless tended to reproduce in their own formulations. A complex set of problems that confronted state planners in the transition from feudal to capitalist arrangements were conceptualized and solved within the language of police science both on the Continent and in England as early as the seventeenth century.

Etymological considerations, therefore, alert us to some important themes of police thinking. First, we need to note the gradual *narrowing* of the concept of police from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century.¹⁸ This has had several consequences for an understanding of police. To start, many contemporary scholars have uncritically accepted liberal definitions of police and ignored early mercantilist and cameralist conceptions. This has created disciplinary silos that have downgraded ‘police science’ from a master discipline aimed at the preservation and extension of the means of the state to a technical sub-discipline of instrumental criminology. Regrettably, police science has

12 T.A. Critchley, *A History of the Police in England and Wales, 900-1966* (London: Constable Press, 1967)

13 Robert Storch, „The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England 1840-1857,“ *International Review of Social History* 20 (1975): 61-90

14 Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham, *Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance*, Law and Social Theory (London: Pluto, 1998), p.128

15 George S. Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of Policing,“ Pp. 260-319 *Re-Imagining Policing in Canada*, ed. Dennis Cooley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

16 Sir William Petty, *The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings* (Vol. 2), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 2, 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1927, orig. 1660-1669, orig. circa 1690, Joseph von Sonnenfels, „Grundsätze Der Polizei, Handlung Und Finanzwissenschaft,“ (1765, Johann H.G. von Justi, *Grundsätze Der Polizeywissenschaft* (1756)

17 Mike Brogden, „An Act to Colonise the Internal Lands of the Island: Empire and the Origins of the Professional Police,“ *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 15 (1987): 179-20, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001)

18 Franz-Ludwig Knemeyer, „Polizei,“ *Economy and Society* 9.2 (1980): 172-96

been “transformed beyond anything recognizable to earlier writers on police powers” – it has become a “backwater” field¹⁹. Second, English notions of police were based on a foreign, *Continental* ‘other’ viewpoint which significantly shaped considerations of the role of police and the legitimacy of the state. In this sense, thinking about ‘what the police ought to be’ was also thinking about ‘what the state ought to be.’ The project of police, when viewed from this etymological perspective, is implicated with the project of nation-building since police seemed tied to national self-identity and wealth creation. To a great degree, this liberal compulsion still haunts national identities today – e.g. the westward marching RCMP, the friendly ‘Bobbie’, the nation-forging Carabiniere, etc.. Indeed, if and when state police monopolies are threatened, new calls emerge for their re-consolidations in order to defend or re-establish the ‘public good’.²⁰

The founding political economists of capital and the leading police intellectuals who first argued for a salaried, centralized and professional police all harkened back to the notion of police science. There were schools of *Polizeiwissenschaft* in Germany,²¹ the seminal *Traite du Police* in France,²² and, of course, a ‘political arithmetic’ in England²³ that led to the first pauper police specifically geared to managing Britain’s dispossessed after their forcible removal from subsistence living. Similar patterns of transition were being experienced across

Europe.²⁴ Thus, to trace the historical development of police science is to trace the managerial and intellectual foundations of capitalism. The rise of police science in the eighteenth century was an idea that included both the thinking and implementation of a system necessary for capital accumulation, which has long subtended developments in the world economic system.

We can say that these ideas about police and their relation to economics may be divided into three general schools: 1) Mercantilism, which encouraged protectionist economic policy and whose general propensity was that of placing *capital in the service of the sovereign*; 2) cameralism, the closest German equivalent to mercantilism, which sought to create a science of *maximizing the collective welfare* of all through state regulation over, among other aspects, trade and commerce, and finally, 3) liberalism, which advocated the individual over the collective and reversed the logics of mercantilism by placing the *state in the service of capital*.²⁵ These modes of economic priority and their relationship to the political body were always considered through a language of police science and were aimed at the enforcement of a *transition*. These are not, of course, discreet phases of economic thinking for they persist to the present in various forms (from modern industrial protectionism in Germany to Keynesianism in England and Austrian liberalism throughout the globe) but in considering the specific transition from the previous two systems toward the prominence of the third we can better understand the modern capitalist policing model and the political and economic basis of neoliberal policing today.²⁶

19 Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police Science“,“ 17

20 Ian Loader and Neil Walker, „Policing as a Public Good: Re-constituting the Connections between Policing and the State,“ *Theoretical Criminology* 5.1 (2001): 9-35, p.11

21 Albion W. Small, *The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Polity* (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001, orig. 1909, Sonnefelds, „Grundsätze Der Polizei, Handlung Und Finanzwissenschaft,“ von Justi, *Grundsätze Der Polizeywissenschaft*

22 Nicolas de La Mare, *Traité De La Police, Où L'on Trouvera L'histoire De Son Établissement, Les Fonctions Et Les Prérogatives De Ses Magistrats ; Toutes Les Loix Et Tous Les Réglemens Qui La Concernent: On Y a Joint Une Description Historique Et Topographique De Paris, & Huit Plans Gravez, Qui Representent Son Ancien Etat, & Ses Divers Accroissemens, Avec Un Recueil De Tous Les Statuts Et Réglemens Des Six Corps Des Marchands, & De Toutes Les Communautés Des Arts & Métiers...* (Paris: J. et P. Cot, 1707)

23 John Graunt and Sir William Petty, *Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a Following Index, and Made Upon the Bills of Mortality* (London: Royal Society, 1662)

24 Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800*, trans. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973)

25 From: George Rigakos, John L. McMullan, Joshua Johnson and Gulden Ozcan, eds., *A General Police System: Political Economy and Security in the Age of Enlightenment* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2009)

26 see the epochal model by: Steven Spitzer, „The Political Economy of Policing,“ Pp. 314-41 *Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology*, ed. David F. Greenberg (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1981).

3.0 Capitalist policing

It is admittedly very difficult to establish a single criterion or model for clearly isolating what we might now consider general policing activity within the broad sweep of human history. Conducting organized patrols, keeping the watch, and generally making one's encampment, fortification or village safe from attack and disorder is probably an activity as old as human sociality cutting across diverse political structures and modes of production.²⁷ Nonetheless, in terms of a system of thought called 'police' and a body of officials by the same name, the emergence of a modern form of organized security and crime prevention in Europe can be traced back to the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century.²⁸ Before this time, feudal production based on kinship in an agrarian system did not require a specialized policing system. Value was based on land. Surplus was realized locally and enforced domestically and imperially by lords and their vassals. Labour was largely static and manufactured goods were not abundant which did not necessitate a "general police system."²⁹

The dissolution of the feudal system and the intense social disorganization that early capitalism unleashed created widespread instability and crises of order. This internal instability was coupled with a renewed external stability achieved through the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War and the Eighty Years War and the signing of the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees that ended the war between France and Spain. These treaties solidified the notion of state sovereignty and signalled a European-wide search for a new domestic

order in the aftermath of incessant warfare. The economic and political needs for stable trade and commerce, and for centralized power systems capable of enabling capitalist growth and imperial conquest resulted in new state experiments for adequate systems of order maintenance to guarantee prosperity through the maintenance of productive workforces – this was, as we have seen, a direct impetus for the search for an adequate science of police.³⁰ Moreover, this emergence of police science coincided with the defining characteristic of the Enlightenment period: the birth of the scientific method – collecting as much empirical information as possible, attending to all constituent parts of a whole, and using knowledge to calculate and analyze in order to predict events with regularity. The birth of "political arithmetic" and the invention of statistics allowed for the study of the "body politic" in the form of "population."³¹ Under this intellectual re-casting, political subjects were tuned into aggregate objects of analysis as an essential step in making police science possible – what Foucault called *bio-power*.³²

While the organization of the first *bona fide* modern state police can be traced to Continental systems, especially in those in France and Germany, we can find no better exemplar of how a truly liberal and capitalist model of policing operates than that of nineteenth century London, and particularly the bodies of police that immediately predated the Metropolitan Police. The 1830 London constabulary of Scotland Yard were preceded by an array of private, public and quasi-public forms of "monied" police

27 Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of Policing.“

28 C. Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, 2nd Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), Critchley, *A History of the Police in England and Wales, 900-1966*, Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

29 Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson and Ozcan, eds., *A General Police System: Political Economy and Security in the Age of Enlightenment*

30 Mark Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power* (London: Pluto Press, 2000)

31 Sir William Petty, *The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings* (Vol. 1), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1927, orig. circa 1690), Michel Foucault, „Governmentality,“ Pp. 87-104 *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

32 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978--1979*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2010)

and notorious “thieftaker”³³ privateers not seen in other parts of Europe until the more recent rise of neoliberalism³⁴ and the dissolution of Soviet state capitalism.³⁵ This boom in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century private policing can be directly attributed to London’s slow and reluctant adoption of a centralized, public policing system already well established in France, Austria and Prussia. But by 1800 the *Thames River Police*, under the direction of the famous police intellectual and magistrate Patrick Colquhoun began to patrol the docks, quays and hulks of London’s shipping artery. It was a private police force under legislative authority, with four-fifths of its budget financed by the West India merchants.

The Thames River Police can be viewed as a capitalist model of policing *par excellence* but we must also remember that the lineage of police thinking that gave birth to this first audacious security experiment is very long and links back to a political economy that was part of the planning and rationale for the emergence of a mercantilist state. Indeed, over a century and a half before the emergence of this first privately financed, yet legislatively formalized, uniformed, salaried, commercial police, Sir William Petty was laying out the groundwork for a ‘political arithmetic’ that would help change Enlightenment thinking about governance. Petty has long been appreciated as the “founder of political economy” and the “inventor of statistics”.³⁶ His *Natural and Political Observations on the Bills on Mortality* (attributed

to John Graunt)³⁷ laid the foundation for a new system of governmentality that would significantly alter how sovereigns viewed their subjects through the prism of ‘populations.’

Thus, while Petty has been acknowledged for his revolutionary contribution to political economy among contemporary economists he has received scant attention for his contribution to the development of ‘police science.’ He understood before most that the true source of new wealth of the emerging capitalist system would come not from rent and property alone but through the circulation of ‘free labour’ which would be able to “superlucrate millions upon millions”³⁸ for the Kingdom. Marx, for example, recognized Petty’s “audacious genius”³⁹ because he understood the mechanics of capital long before his contemporaries. Petty also personally benefitted from his statistical and analytical gifts as he was granted sizeable estates including the Irish town of Kenmar that he designed using triangular patterned roadways bearing his name and title. He developed not only the broad project of political economy, but also understood that wealth creation was dependent on a systematic approach to surveillance and control of populations through accounting. He noted as early as 1690 in his advice to the Crown that the Irish simply refused to work more than the few hours necessary to secure their own sustenance. Since the Irish had access to land and because they were able to grow their own food this undermined the kingdom’s ability to extract their full productive potential. His recommendations included forcibly “transporting them and their goods” so that the Irish would have little choice other than to sell their labour in the factories of England. The expropriation of their land, therefore, was part of a civilizing process that would make them closer to the English. Of course, more abundant wealth could be accrued by ‘freeing’ the Irish labourer creating: “...spare Hands enough among the King

33 John L. McMullan, „The Political Economy of Thief-Taking,” *Crime, Law, and Social Change: An International Journal* 23 (1995): 121-46

34 Volker Eick and Kendra Briken, eds., *Urban (in)Security: Policing the Neoliberal Crisis* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2014, Les Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing* (London: Routledge, 1992, Jaap de Waard, „The Private Security Industry in International Perspective,” *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 7 (1999): 143-74

35 Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002)

36 See the pronouncements made by the Marquis of Lansdowne in Sir William Petty, *The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings* (Vol. 1), ed. Marquis of Lansdowne, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London: Constable, 1927).

37 Graunt and Petty, *Natural and Political Observations Mentioned in a Following Index, and Made Upon the Bills of Mortality*

38 J. Brewer, „Law and Disorder in Stuart and Hanoverian England,” *History Today* January (1980): 18-27

39 Karl Marx, „Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Pp. 16-25 *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978, orig. 1843). App. A fn.2.

of England's Subjects, to earn two Millions per annum more than they now do; and that there are also Employments, ready, proper, and sufficient, for that purpose".⁴⁰

Sir William Petty's abilities at surveying and urban planning were thus aimed at eliciting the maximum level of productivity from subjects of the English Crown, including those who lived in cities. Not only is this expressed in Petty's design of the Irish town of Kenmar but even more so in his detailed plan for the city of London including especially the erection of an encircling wall. He argued that this 'London wall' should be "100^m foot in circumference, 11 foot-high, two brick thick, in a fortification figure, with 20 gates, worth 20^m£..." But what would the purpose of such a wall be? For the security of the city? In part, but this seems only supplementary to its primary function for Petty. Thus, the function of the wall was "[t]o take an accompt of all persons and things going in and out of the City" and to provide "[a] foundation of liberties, securities, and privileges" which included who may be allowed into the city, how their possessions should be catalogued, a taxation system, a system of management for those who were not productive, a licensing system for beggars and so forth. William Petty's London wall is an architectural design that goes far beyond bricks and mortar.

For the first time in recorded history a city wall was to be erected not for the purposes of fortification and defense but rather as a method of surveillance and for the best means of keeping accounts. The gates would be guarded not by sword but by pen.⁴¹ Metaphorically, therefore, the London wall symbolizes the confluence of the project of police and capital through the statistical ordering of populations, the end purpose of which was to make subjects more 'productive'. Years earlier, Petty imagined a much more austere system for delinquents and debtors in Ireland, including that "all men be bound to keep Accompts of their Receipts and Issues, Gayn and Losse, Debts & Credits, in mony, Cattle & Goods, and where they were at noon and

every night every day in the yeare, with mention of what deeds here hath made or witnessed". No house would stand alone nor outside the call of some other house in order to ensure effective communication in times of crisis and to allow for a system of surveillance and apprehension. Finally, Petty proposed in the middle of the 17th century what has now become a common refrain among the security establishment: a national identification system so that "[every] man carry about him an uncounterfittable Tickett, expressing his name, the numero of his Howse, his Age, Trade, Stature, Haire, eye, and other peculiar marks of his Body."⁴² Thus, not only was Sir William Petty the inventor of statistics, the founder of political economy, and early colonial surveyor and planner, he was also one of the initial architects of capitalism by arguing for the establishment and enforcement of a wage labor system. He thus laid the groundwork for the development of 'police science' to follow, very early recognizing not only that the new source of wealth under capitalist relationships would be 'free labour' but simultaneously understanding the forms of surveillance and pacification necessary to make capitalism function.

While Petty is often recognized for his contribution to political economy yet largely unappreciated for his contribution to police science,⁴³ the reverse is true of Patrick Colquhoun. Long recognized as the strongest proponent of the 'new police' that would eventually patrol the streets of London in 1830, most police analysts overlook his important contribution to political economy. Before Colquhoun was to become famous for advocating a London police that was centralized, salaried, and professional he was a commercial master in the New England colony of Virginia, specializing in shipping and trade. As a loyalist to the Crown he also helped finance a Glasgow Regiment sent to put down the emerging American revolution. Thus, before Colquhoun penned his famous *Treatise On The Commerce and Police of the River Thames*⁴⁴ and his opus *Treatise*

40 Petty, *The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings* (Vol. 1) iv

41 Juri Mykkänen, „'To Methodize and Regulate Them': William Petty's Governmental Science of Statistics," *History of the Human Sciences* 7 (1994): 65-88

42 Petty, *The Petty Papers: Some Unpublished Writings* (Vol. 1) Nos. 10 to 17.

43 except see George S. Rigakos and Richard W. Hadden, „Crime, Capitalism and the Risk Society: Towards the Same Olde Modernity?," *Theoretical Criminology* 5.1 (2001): 61-84

44 Patrick Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc.* (London: Mawman, 1800, orig. 1795)

on the *Police of the Metropolis*⁴⁵ he was compiling one of the most comprehensive statistical overviews of the resources of the British empire. Like Sir William Petty before him, Colquhoun understood in his catalogue of the British Empire's holdings that "[the] resources of nations are derived from the productive labour of the people" and that this labour "is augmented or diminished according to forms of government, and the intelligence, ability and zeal... in those to whom it is assigned to direct the state of affairs of states and empires".⁴⁶ Petty experimented with the Irish, Colquhoun with the Virginians. Both, however, subsequently proposed policing projects *domestically*, aimed at the 'indigent poor', the criminal classes and eventually the entire English working class.

The police role in enforcing a class-based structure of economic prosperity had been central to Colquhoun's thinking. Colquhoun argued that the port of London stood to lose upwards of 60 million pounds while maintaining his police would cost only a fraction of that amount. His understanding of police extended 'security to Commercial Property', where he claimed that "the privileges of innocence will be preserved, and the comforts of Civil society eminently enlarged".⁴⁷

Colquhoun's class politics were especially obvious in his work for the Thames shippers and London merchants where he set about instituting a system of surveillance that eliminated customary compensation outside official lumping rates (wages). He argued for "the abolition of the perquisite of chips", including "sweepings", "samplings"⁴⁸ and "the abolition of fees and perquisites of every description" in favour of "a liberal increase in salaries".⁴⁹ This form of cost rationalization is thus a harbinger of Fordism to come over a century later. A predictable system of compensation had to be enforced in order

to guarantee profits which meant that pre-capitalist practices like owning a piece of the fruits of one's labour had to be eliminated. Of course, Colquhoun's initiatives did not go unopposed. Pacification expects resistance⁵⁰ and so the Thames River police office was ransacked by rioting workers. Colquhoun nonetheless persisted and, in the long run, reported that his new system of police had saved the river's commercial interests over 122£ million.

It is important to appreciate that Colquhoun skillfully created and enforced a wage labour system at the precise time and place where international capitalism demanded it most – the heart of Imperial England. The lumping rates were arrived at so that "honest labour can be procured for daily wages" and so that lumpers would not resort to 'plunder'.⁵¹ Rates were publicly posted at the Thames Police office. Master lumpers (dock foremen) were scrutinized by the police; clothing used to conceal customs and payments in kind such as wide trousers, jemmies, and concealed pockets were banned; lumpers were searched; all ships, contents and manifests registered and their contents guarded. Colquhoun's 'police machine'⁵² was directed specifically at class discipline by uplifting the indigent poor and fabricating the working conditions of the 'useful' poor. He believed that "by this... a confidence is to be established... the improvement of public morals will contribute, in an eminent degree, to the happiness and prosperity of the country".⁵³ The purpose of this police machine was clear: "to extend the scope of productive labour"⁵⁴ if not directly in the production of goods then certainly in intensifying exploita-

45 Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc.*

46 Patrick Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire* (London: Joseph Mawman, 1814), p.49

47 Patrick Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames* (London: Joseph Mawman, 1800), p. 38.

48 Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames*, p. 138.

49 Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, Etc.*, p. 355.

50 Rigakos, George. "'To Extend the Scope of Productive Labour:' Pacification as a Police Project." *Anti-Security*. Eds. Rigakos, George and Mark Neocleous. Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011. 57-83.

51 Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames*, p. 619.

52 John L. McMullan, "Social Surveillance and the Rise of the 'Police Machine,'" *Theoretical Criminology* 2.1 (1998): 93-117

53 Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames*

54 Colquhoun, *A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire* 232

tion in the circuit of capital through the transport of commodities at the docks.⁵⁵

Contemporary empirical research has revealed a continued correlation between worker exploitation, household inequality and more policing, both internationally and in the United States over time.⁵⁶ These relationships persist even in divergent legal and political contexts with significant variations in institutional histories of policing. It seems that

the more unequal a society, the more exploited the workers, the more dependent that society is on policing. More aptly put, the more insecure that ruling elites become, the more dependent they are on policing, both public and private. The historical development of police science as a system of thought, the first deployment of a capitalist police models and the continued resilience and growth of this model amid crises of capitalism demonstrate the close relationship between policing and the contemporary global economic system.

The interrelationships imagined by early police scientists on the Continent and England between police science and capital accumulation have remained largely intact. Indeed, the imperial nature of security has only accelerated after the events of September 11, 2001, legitimating a renewed expansion of the security-industrial complex. This amplification of risk mitigation, more security thinking and expenditures was well underway before 9/11.

55 For Marx, the system of distribution falls under Department II which means that no surplus value is realized at the point of sale since no additional value has been added by the retailer. Nonetheless, the transport industry was an exception to this for Marx as the movement of goods which included the expenditure of resources and labour to make commodities available for consumption certainly added to the exchange value of goods, making those working in the transport industry “productive.”

56 Rigakos and Ergul, „*The Pacification of the American Working Class: A Longitudinal Study*,“ Rigakos and Ergul, „*Policing the Industrial Reserve Army: An International Study*,“

4.0 Security as hegemony

These are difficult times to be opposed to the global economic system. Capitalism has ostensibly survived another crisis for which the long-term repercussions and the potential for another abrupt decline are still looming.⁵⁷ In light of this apparent *resilient fragility* and the apparent absence of a ready alternative, neoliberalism has ideologically reasserted itself, doubling down through austerity⁵⁸ and the ramping up of an ever more bloated security-industrial complex.⁵⁹ The answer to this insecurity is again more security which is always by definition *insecure*.⁶⁰ This cycle of risk mitigation with its ideological “bottomless barrel of demands”⁶¹ has myriad consequences for the environment,⁶² the economy,⁶³

popular culture,⁶⁴ the judiciary,⁶⁵ and the police.⁶⁶ Institutional threats are increasingly viewed through the lens of security; social problems become reimagined as security concerns; and economic instability and poverty are, of course, security threats. The supremacy of security has resulted in an analytic blockage.⁶⁷ So much so that it can be said that today “security is hegemony.”⁶⁸

This raises significant challenges for any radical politics, especially from the Left. Indeed, it places any opposition to this global security superstructure, ideologically buttressed and significantly ramped up after 9/11, in a direct antagonistic relationship with Empire and its international system of police.⁶⁹ Of course, this tension is hardly new but it has perhaps now more than ever reached the point where security has become not only the “supreme concept of bourgeois society” as Marx put it in the nineteenth century but the predominant mobilizing concern for both production and consumption. Security not only rationalizes the entire system of pacification legislatively and juridically but security is embedded in the circulation of goods that define us as individuals.

It is this basic understanding of security and its role within all aspects of the circuit of capitalist production that we must first understand if there is to be an effective socialist police science as an alternative. We should understand this hegemony to be

57 Ernest Mandel, *Long Waves of Capitalist Development: A Marxist Interpretation* (London: Verso, 1995, orig. 1980, orig. 1980, Leo Panitch, Greg Albo and Vivek Chibber, eds., *The Crisis and the Left: Socialist Register 2012* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012)

58 Tim Fowler, ed., *From Crisis to Austerity: Neoliberalism, Organized Labour and the Canadian State* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2013, Carlo Fanelli, Chris Hurl, Priscillia Lefebvre and Gülden Özcan, eds., *Saving Global Capitalism: Interrogating Austerity and Working Class Responses to Crises* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2010)

59 Rigakos and Ergul, „The Pacification of the American Working Class: A Longitudinal Study,“; Rigakos and Ergul, „Policing the Industrial Reserve Army: An International Study,“; Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. Kappeler, „Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,“ *Social Problems* 44.1 (1997): 1-18

60 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 1990

61 Gabe Mythen, „Employment, Individualization and Insecurity: Rethinking the Risk Society Perspective,“ *The Sociological Review* 53.1 (2005): 129-49

62 Ulrich Beck, „Modern Society as a Risk Society,“ Pp. 199-214 *The Culture and Power of Knowledge*, eds. N. Stehr and Richard V. Ericson (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1992), Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992)

63 Aaron Doyle and Richard Ericson, *Uncertain Business: Risk, Insurance and the Limits of Knowledge* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, Ulrich Beck, „A Risky Business,“ *L.S.E. Magazine* 199, Uwe Engel and Hermann Strasser, „Global Risks and Social Inequality: Critical Remarks on the Risk-Society Hypothesis,“ *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 23.1 (1998): 91-103

64 Frank Furedi, *Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation* (Harrison PA: Continuum Publications, 1997)

65 George L. Priest, „The New Legal Structure of Risk Control,“ *Daedalus* 119 (1990): 207-27

66 Richard V. Ericson and Kevin D. Haggerty, *Policing the Risk Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997)

67 Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos „Anti-Security: A Declaration,“ Pp. 15-21 *Anti-Security* (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011).

68 George Rigakos, „To Extend the Scope of Productive Labour: Pacification as a Police Project,“ Pp. 57-83 *Anti-Security*, eds. George Rigakos and Mark Neocleous (Ottawa: Red Quill Books, 2011), George Rigakos and Martin Manolov, „Anti-Security: Q and a Interview,“ *Annual Review of Interdisciplinary Justice Research* 12 (2012): 9-26

69 Hardt and Negri, *Empire*

the aggregate effect of alienation.⁷⁰ This alienation, in turn, is the ideological and cultural manifestation of commodity fetishism that stems from workers being divorced from the fruits of their own labour and from how other commodities are produced – otherwise understood as the mystification of production and consumption. Most of us are keenly aware that we are living in an era that is defined by consumption and that this consumption helps make up our identities.⁷¹ Of course, the effect here is that the ubiquity of security and risk management means that the entire production and consumption process is saturated with security considerations⁷² that seem aesthetic. Places of consumption must seem like safe places to shop: places where “our type of people” venture. Increasingly, societies are based around consumption practices that are structured by security logics. Ideologically, whether at the national, international or local level, security in this context must be said to be hegemonic.⁷³

Against this hegemony a new understanding of security must be built that represents nothing less than a police system that facilitates a transition to a new democratic economic order in the same way that police science fabricated a new order for feudalism’s transition into capitalism in the eighteenth century.

70 Ernest Mandel and George Edward Novack, *The Marxist Theory of Alienation: Three Essays* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970)

71 Jean Baudrillard, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*, trans. Chris Turner (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1998, orig. 1970)

72 These security considerations are as macroeconomic as securing supply routes, securing oil fields, securing trade markets, etc. and as microeconomic as building in product security at the design level to offset the potential for litigation, selling the aesthetic of security and safety as part of the enticement to buy the product in marketing campaigns, creating product guarantees and establishing industry security ratings like five-star safety ratings and so forth. These security considerations extend to consumption as well. It envelops the entire circuit of capital. Areas of consumption such as malls and Business Improvement Districts, for example, are quite obsessed with security.

73 Rigakos, „To Extend the Scope of Productive Labour:“ Pacification as a Police Project,“ , Rigakos and Manolov, „Anti-Security: Q and a Interview,“

5.0 A Left approach towards the police

Our approach to democratizing the police is inevitably coloured by what we think the police can potentially become – our political *problematique*. These possibilities in turn are a product of how we see both the institutions of policing and the knowledge system of police science operating in capitalism. We have argued that the police are not a passive institution of capitalist formation but an active locus through which police science concocted schemes for building a capitalist order and then set about enforcing these relationships – the fabrication of social order.⁷⁴ This system is tied to the bourgeois project of pacification⁷⁵ which centrally includes making populations ‘productive’: that is, exploiting workers in order to extract surplus and enforcing property relations that subtend the mode of production. We have also argued that while the police operate within a wide range of organizational structures there is nonetheless “a general police system” and a capitalist policing model that has been ideologically amplified by neoliberalism both across Europe and in Greece. This model is ubiquitous, straddling both public and private forms⁷⁶ and operating within a broad hegemony of security.

5.1 A Left politics of policing

Let us first start with the basic principle that a Left approach to understanding and reforming the police must include a coming to terms with the fact that *the police can no longer be treated as the enemy*. The public police must now be appreciated as nothing more than a vehicle for establishing and enforcing a social order that while institutionally aligned

with the interests of the capitalist state today⁷⁷ are not necessarily endemic to it. Second, it must also be accepted that there will always be a form of what we now understand as policing “after the revolution”—no matter how far-reaching this revolution is imagined to be—given the development of the division of labour in advanced European economies.⁷⁸ It is therefore incumbent on the democratic Left to seriously consider the role and organization of the police in a system where the mode of production is supposed to be transitioning from capitalism.

Police institutions are not easy to transform but they are not monolithic either.⁷⁹ There is often dissent within the ranks and various practices and deployments are often criticized by line officers. As in all complex organizations, there are political ruptures throughout. There are examples of the police defying the orders of authoritarian capitalism including refusing to board rail cars to smash strikes,⁸⁰ aligning with the interests of a particular caste of workers to fight off scabs⁸¹ or even joining a General Strike⁸² on the side of workers. Indeed, the local police often proved so unreliable as strike breakers during North America’s early industrial era that perhaps the most significant development in police transformation reflected the need to create detached and easily mobilized state, federal or private police⁸³

74 Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power*

75 Mark Neocleous, George S. Rigakos and Tyler Wall „On Pacification: Introduction to the Special Issue,“ *Socialist Studies* 9.2 (2013): 1-6

76 Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing*, Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of Policing,“ , Nigel South, „Private Security, the Division of Policing Labor and the Commercial Compromise of the State,“ *Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control* 6 (1984): 171-98

77 Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism*

78 Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. W. D. Halls (New York: Free Press, 1967)

79 Janet Chan, *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

80 S.R. Couch, „Selling and Reclaiming State Sovereignty: The Case of the Coal and Iron Police,“ *Insurgent Sociologist* 10.4 & 11 (1981): 1, 85-9, Robert Weiss, „The Emergence and Transformation of Private Detective Industrial Policing in the United States, 1850-1940,“ *Crime & Social Justice* 9 (1978): 35-48

81 Bruce C. Johnson, „Taking Care of Labor: The Police in American Politics,“ *Theory and Society* 3 (1976): 89-117

82 Lorne Brown and Caroline Brown, *An Unauthorized History of the RCMP (2ed.)* (Toronto: Lewis and Samuel, 1978, Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, *When the State Trembled: How A.J. Andrews and the Citizens’ Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)

83 Frank Morn, *The Eye That Never Sleeps* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1998)

to quash local unrest in lieu of the military – the implications of which were well understood by the labour movement of the early twentieth century.⁸⁴

The policing of protest today, of course, has become a science unto itself and while it is, on the whole, less lethal than it was in the past,⁸⁵ it has become far more obviously militarized,⁸⁶ insidious⁸⁷ and wide-ranging, casting a fine net over activists and protesters and radically expanding intelligence-gathering and surveillance before and after ceremonial gatherings of corporate and state elites, especially at Summits.⁸⁸ The Left ought not to be surprised by any of these politics. Police agencies of different types have performed as functionaries of order enforcement for a wide gamut of political regimes. Closest to home and in recent history, when East and West Germany were unified after 1989 their respective East and West Berlin police shared patrol cars in an attempt to bureaucratically and culturally unify the agencies. A timely anthropological backseat account of these patrol car interactions produced a chronicle of the clash of two ideologies directly affecting police decision-making. On the job debates ensued as, in one case, an East Berlin police officer chastized his West Berlin police partner for selectively harassing destitute-looking Germans.⁸⁹ East German police were also astounded that West German police refused to wear their uniforms to and from work as if they were ashamed to be police officers. They wondered what they had to

be ashamed of. These types of disagreements among police rarely surface publicly because it could undermine the legal position of officers at trial and undercut the fraternal esprit des corps, which is a requisite part of the mythology of policing.⁹⁰

Despite these cleavages, we must nonetheless concede that short of corporate boardrooms, football booster clubs, and monarchist leagues there are few more conservative associations than police unions.⁹¹ But perhaps this is also a product of their isolation from the broader workers' movements, both self-imposed but often also foisted upon them. Perhaps it is a reflection of their position of guardians of public order that they are inevitably forced to physically clash with contemporary social movements. Of course, there is a particular suspicion about police unions amongst the Left. The belief is that they are inherently reactionary, unsympathetic and antithetical to the Left's mission. This state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue.

Marx and Marxists have long conceded that unions are inherently problematic for the Left in any case⁹² but leaving police unions in isolation means never having a conversation about the police officer as a worker and thus never initiating a bona fide reflection about the authority of the police line officer to affect change in their own institution and to do so with the support of the Left. In the absence of such an identification, the police line officer is

84 Kenneth H. Bechtel, *State Police in the United States: A Socio-historical Analysis* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995)

85 Notwithstanding, more recently, the police killings of Carlo Giuliani in Genoa in 2001, Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Athens in 2008, and Ian Tomlinson in London in 2009.

86 Kraska and Kappeler, „Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units,“

87 Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, *Undercover: The True Story of Britain's Secret Police* (London: Guardian Books, 2014)

88 Willem De Lint and Alan Hall, *Intelligent Control: Developments in Public Order Policing in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), Lamb and Rigakos, „Pacification through ‚Intelligence‘ During the Toronto G20,“ , Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement*, Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, „Globalization and the Policing of Protest: The Case of Apec 1997,“ *British Journal of Sociology* 50 (1999): 587-60, Evans and Lewis, *Undercover: The True Story of Britain's Secret Police*

89 Andreas Glaeser, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000)

90 John Van Maanen, „Kinsmen in Repose: Occupational Perspectives of Patrolmen,“ Pp. *Policing: A View from the Street*, eds. Peter K. Manning and John Van Maanen (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1978), Reiner, *The Politics of the Police, 2nd Edition*, John P. Crank, *Understanding Police Culture* (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 1998), Jerome Skolnick, *Justice without Trial* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1966)

91 Although even here there are interesting ruptures forming. The Ontario Provincial Police Union (the union representing the Province of Ontario's police service) recently ran a very public ad campaign during the 2014 provincial election in opposition to proposed austerity measures by the Conservative Party. See: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-votes-2014/ontario-election-2014-opp-officers-union-launches-anti-hudak-ads-1.2661984>

92 By 1872, Marx complained in his speech to the General Council of the International Workers' Association that “[t]rade unions are praised too much; they must in the future be treated as affiliated societies and used as centers of attack in the struggle of labour against capital.” Karl Marx, „On Wages, Hours, and the Trade-Union Struggle,“ Pp. 90-93 *Marx and Engels on the Trade Unions*, ed. K. Lapides (New York: Praeger, 1987).

left little choice but to ideologically (and sometimes physically) ally with whatever constituency shows its support – even Fascist elements. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the most ideologically right-wing regime of the last four decades—the Thatcher government—set about providing the English police huge contractual concessions almost as soon as it came to office in exchange for their support in crushing unions throughout the country including especially the miner’s strike of 1984–85.⁹³

This pact between the Right and police has historically been *neoconservative* in nature, which differs from its newer *neoliberal* manifestation.⁹⁴ The neoliberal orientation, in the parlance of Austrian economics, is quite uncomfortable with accepting government alliances with public sector institutions looking for “rent-seeking” agreements. Under such thinking, even public policing ought to be subject to market forces⁹⁵ and should not have a monopoly over public safety which brings the historic alliance between the Right and the police into an interesting period of flux. There is an opportunity, therefore, to undercut the historic alliance between the Right and police by seizing upon the police front line officer as worker—who works in an intensely stressful job with little respite and recourse to outside supports⁹⁶ and deeply dependent on police executive decision-making.

There is some narrative building that must be developed here in order to forge such an alliance but there are ample stories of police solidarity with workers throughout the Western world. In some countries, like Greece, the distance between police and the Left seems historically entrenched in the Cold-War politics of regional stabilization leading to a Civil War period and junta creating even starker

divisions.⁹⁷ But these tensions must now *necessarily* be viewed as antiquated and a democratic Left must overcome them in forging a new state organization. Alliances with the police are important for the success of any political order and this begins at the both the top and the bottom of the police organization.

5.2 Policing as labour

Police officers are workers. They may be said to be reproducers⁹⁸ or even fabricators⁹⁹ of a social order conducive to capital accumulation – this much is true. But there are also a wide assortment of occupations in late capitalism that are just as important to its survival ranging from insurance¹⁰⁰ to world finance.¹⁰¹ In the eyes of capitalism, the public police, like the public service sector generally, are also unproductive workers in that they produce no vendible commodity and no surplus-value.¹⁰² This is why the largest threat to the monopoly of public policing, in its purest sense, comes from neoliberalism which advocates for private security¹⁰³ and the security technology industry where security labour can be economically exploited and/or replaced by the production of vendible security products that

93 The historic Tory-police union pact in the UK appears to be problematized recently as neoliberalism has begun to trump neoconservatism among the right: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/21/theresa-may-ripped-up-tory-pact-police-thatcher>

94 Nikolas Rose, „Governing ‚Advanced‘ Liberal Democracies,” Pp. 37-64 *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, eds. Anrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (London: UCL Press, 1996).

95 See the account of libertarian notions of police in: Johnston, *The Rebirth of Private Policing*

96 Crank, *Understanding Police Culture*

97 George S. Rigakos and Georgios Papanicolau, „The Political Economy of Greek Policing: Between Neo-Liberalism and the Sovereign State,” *Policing and Society* 13.3 (2003): 271-304

98 Richard V. Ericson, *Reproducing Order* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982)

99 Neocleous, *The Fabrication of Social Order: A Critical Theory of Police Power*

100 Doyle and Ericson, *Uncertain Business: Risk, Insurance and the Limits of Knowledge*

101 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Edition de la Maison de l’Homme, 1979)

102 George S. Rigakos, *The New Parapolice: Risk Markets and Commodified Social Control* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, Stephen Spitzer, „Security and Control in Capitalist Societies: The Fetishism of Security and the Secret Thereof,” Pp. 43-58 *Transcarceration: Essays in the Sociology of Social Control*, eds. John Lowman, Robert J. Menzies and Ted S. Palys, Cambridge Studies in Criminology (Aldershot: Gower, 1987).

103 George S. Rigakos, „Policing the Nightclub: Surveillance, Consumption and Social Order in a Risk Market,” *Canadian Review of Policing Research* 1 (2004): 54-60

create surplus-value such as CCTV.¹⁰⁴ The police must be made to realize the irony of their alliance in upholding a politics that under neoliberalism today most directly threatens their existence because of its general rejection of the ‘public good.’

The defense of public policing is a rather uncomfortable position for the Left and usually an ideological dead-end because it reifies a dichotomy (public versus private) that liberalism has historically used to justify all sorts of violence.¹⁰⁵ Yet if one looks at the organization of policing on the whole, one sees the rapid rise of private policing and the security technology industry in tandem with the increasing insecurity of policing labour. Moreover, if we understand that the primary function of policing under capitalism has been the protection of property relations, one must ask what happens to monitoring and oversight of the excesses of such a protection when policing responsibility has been shifted increasingly to private agents with little or no pretense or regard for the “public good” and beholden to no one other than their corporate masters? The public-private dichotomy is a fool’s game in policing which is why the Left must approach the restructuring of policing labour in all its forms.

In this way, even the private security guard must be appreciated as alienated labour *par excellence* under late capitalism. This is a worker who is almost never unionized, works unnatural hours, usually for little pay and on an hourly basis and who is always in danger of physical attack.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, on an ideological level you would be hard-pressed to find a more alienated worker—someone who is ill trained, bedecked with a corporate logo to signify that s/he is a product, in constant threat of being replaced by security technology and asked to engage in what

should otherwise be appreciated as the natural and communal act of ensuring public safety. Instead, security guards protect property not their own, their family’s nor anyone they likely know usually at the behest of a foreign corporate owner contracted to a landlord who likely exploits his friends and neighbours. This is a deeply alienated existence for any security worker who stops to contemplate their situation and certainly an opening for the Left to interrogate. Understanding the security guard as a worker just like the police officer is imperative to building a strategy for the Left.

5.3 Democratic control

There is an English liberal sentiment about the police that continues to circulate and is probably more myth than reality. Perhaps more accurately, it speaks to a nostalgia about the modern police first invoked as the Metropolitan police mustered at Scotland Yard in 1830. Known as Peel’s central principle¹⁰⁷ and named after the Home Office Minister who championed the first modern police it states: “The police are the public and the public are the police.” It should not be overlooked that this principle¹⁰⁸ was being invoked just at the moment when the old feudal system of social control had been systematically replaced by a centralized, salaried and specialized force made necessary to safeguard and promulgate a new economic and social order.¹⁰⁹ It replaced a voluntary, uncompensated and duty-bound system tied to manorial protection by the peasantry tied to land – a system remarkably common among other agrarian, monarchical societies.¹¹⁰ The idea that the police and the public were one in the same was being conjured at the precise moment when the police and the public were, in fact, no longer the same at all and more accurately marks a milestone when the state became increasingly insecure about legitimizing and enforcing a

104 George S. Rigakos, „Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice,” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 23.1 (1999): 381-40, George S. Rigakos, „The Significance of Economic Trends for the Future of Police and Security,” Pp. 176-79 *Police and Security: What the Future Holds*, ed. Jane Richardson (Ottawa: Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, 2000).

105 Couch, „Selling and Reclaiming State Sovereignty: The Case of the Coal and Iron Police,” Neocleous and Rigakos „Anti-Security: A Declaration,” , Rigakos, „Beyond Public-Private: Toward a New Typology of Policing,”

106 Mark Button, *Security Officers and Policing: Powers, Culture and Control in the Governance of Private Space* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

107 C. Reith, *The Police and the Democratic Ideal* (London: Oxford University Press, 1943)

108 There are nine in total. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peelian_Principles

109 McMullan, „Social Surveillance and the Rise of the ‘Police Machine’,”

110 Spitzer, „The Political Economy of Policing,”

new, unjust economic formation—the new *insecurity* of capitalist property relations.¹¹¹

The democratization of policing, therefore, should be understood as far more than simply accommodating “public input”, facilitating adequate civilian oversight and even directly electing some police leaders.¹¹² These are laudable liberal initiatives that must not be abandoned by the Left but they do not achieve a truly democratized policing model. Such a model would have to contemplate facilitating internal democratic control among the police membership and even the ability of police officers and security guards to appeal to civilian bodies for redress against their masters. Policing workers, like other workers, must be empowered and protected by the Left and in order for them to begin to self-identify with the Left’s. Civilian control and oversight must come to be seen as a protection and a service to policing workers and not just a committee of critical reviewers.

Policing also cannot be democratized if, as in the case of private security, it is specifically organized around a corporate structure that simply replicates existing modes of capitalist exploitation. We have made it clear that structures of policing are intimately bound up with the fabrication of capitalism (the police-capital connection) and that *police* science can be seen as *capitalist* science and the foundation of modern disciplinary sciences. Any attempted change from the current system of policing without simultaneously challenging its political economy misses the point of a democratic Left alternative.

The Left must seek to undermine the replication and preservation of private capital facilitated by the neoliberal divestment of state authority to private agents and instead should seek the promotion of alternative business structures that promote the public good. To date, there are no recorded instances of worker-cooperative private security

firms.¹¹³ There is no reason why a democratic Left government cannot give primacy to contract security provision of state facilities to such worker-owned democratic firms thus giving birth to a new, nimble and competitive business entity that undercuts the entire model of capitalist policing and surplus-value in the process.¹¹⁴ Both ideologically and structurally this will have a significant impact on the industry. Public tender contracts for security services are a large share of the market and could have a substantial effect on what is otherwise a high-turnover, low-income and alienating position. Many of the expensive but relatively simple guard functions now undertaken by the state police could easily be transferred to worker-cooperative security companies that have democratic ownership and no need for unions.

Of course, the more concrete, long-term economic and ideological intervention for the Left is to make use of part-time and voluntary policing bodies as part of the network of state policing provision. The best way to ensure civilian sensibilities and a democratic understanding of police work is to divest its culture and bureaucracy from an isolationist notion and build a working solidarity with non-career police personnel who do police work as part of their national sense of service. This is where there will likely be significant push-back from state police unions but there is no reason why part-time and voluntary police cannot be included into the union structure. In fact, this is preferable as it will significantly alter the political conservatism and democratic functioning of such organizations. The Left must insist on the significant democratization of these union organizations in order to make alternative and progressive voices heard within police associations.

Finally, if the Left is to be serious about the inter-relationship between the public and private policing

111 Neocleous, „Theoretical Foundations of the „New Police Science“,“

112 As is now the case in some jurisdictions in the United States and contemplated for UK police commissioners (see Appendix).

113 There are some examples of “non-profit” security entities in Germany but these agencies are not democratically owned by the worker’s themselves and their labour is still precarious. In a sense the lumpen are asked to police the lumpen in state-supported urban policing welfare programs. See: Volker Eick, „New Strategies of Policing the Poor: Berlin’s Neo-Liberal Security System,“ *Policing and Society* 13.4 (2003): 365-7, Volker Eick, „Preventive Urban Discipline: Rent-a-Cops and Neoliberal Globalization in Germany,“ *Social Justice* 33.3 (2006): 1-19

114 Security contracts are typically exempt

functions and the oversight and permeability of policing structures, democratization of the police will also require the establishment of democratically elected police boards at the local or regional levels to oversee the myriad of policing provision taking place there. These boards must have say over the local police executive, must have democratic control over a budget for the allocation of resources to alternative policing entities including part-time, auxiliary, and worker-coop security services. The budget for security provision must be democratized so that local police board members can make decisions about security provision that best suits their

needs.¹¹⁵ All of this, however, needs to take place within a firm set of guidelines that eliminates the tendency toward demagoguery and the targeting of particular populations – a potential threat that can be eliminated within a regulative structure and adequate mission statement for such boards.

With these key approaches in mind, we turn to addressing how these principles might manifest themselves more directly as part of a platform for action by the Left.

115 Such initiatives may not be as radical as they seem. Similar plans have been proposed for Canada, see: George S. Rigakos, *In Search of Security: The Roles of Public and Private Agencies* (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2002) and Northern Ireland: Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland (Aka the Patten Report)*. (Belfast: Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, 1999).

6.0 A platform for action

The preceding sections have outlined the set of structural, historical and practical factors that a democratic Left programme for policing must acknowledge, confront and overcome. To be sure, the theoretical fact that the police function and the ideology of security is deeply intertwined with the very process of capitalist reproduction may represent an absolute limit for reforming the police in capitalist society. Nevertheless, the set of historical and practical factors leading to the entrenchment of the police within a particular institutional role and within particular organisational forms under conditions of liberal democracy should be understood as posing a series of barriers rather than limits. This means that there is a genuine margin for reform along the lines of a democratic Left vision of the police prioritising security as a public good and fostering social fairness, integrity and democratic control.

As we have articulated above, the Left's platform for action on policing ought to proceed within an approach that prioritizes: (i) the *politics of policing*;

(ii) *policing as labour*; and (iii) the need to establish strong mechanisms of *democratic control*. With this general approach in mind the Left should consider the following tenets in forming a more specific platform of action:

- Re-frame public safety;
- Re-define the police professional;
- Establish a dense network of external controls;
- Implement democratic restructuring;
- Facilitate citizen participation;
- Engage directly with private policing

Implicit in our analysis is the idea that policing is very much contingent on context. Developments, particularly in the second half of the 20th century, have it made more evident that policing too is not immune to the economic, political and ideological relations of dominance and dependency that shape the global system. In policing, the hegemonic discourse of security, the ascendancy of technoc-

ratism,¹¹⁶ the increasing reliance on technology, the pervasiveness of marketization and privatization,¹¹⁷ all reinforce the sense that it is irreversibly subject to homogenizing forces that traverse national contexts. Post- 9/11 developments, combining a police response both to the perceived threat of international terrorism and the higher levels of popular mobilization against austerity are also characterized by a regression to more paramilitarized, intrusive, violent and unaccountable forms of policing. Ultimately, however, police systems continue to reflect the characteristics of their particular social formations. In what follows we flesh out the six tenets we list above, but we wish to warn in advance that their precise elaboration requires additional reflection on the national context in each case.

6.1 Re-frame public safety

It is imperative that the democratic Left whether in opposition or in government establishes a set of fundamental principles guiding its approach towards the police. In capitalist societies, the police is made up of a constellation of institutions that are deep-rooted and essential to the state which cannot be abolished or radically reformed in an instant. The Left cannot afford to adopt a political practice of permanent radical opposition against the police. Such a stance is likely to alienate, and it has already alienated social groups that are critical for the construction of a wide political alliance sharing an egalitarian and emancipatory social vision. The longer the Left ignores what social order will look like the day after being elected the longer it relegates itself

to permanent opposition.¹¹⁸ An understanding and communication of how “public safety will be better,” and how “streets will be more peaceful” and personal safety enhanced must be articulated to the general electorate not because it is a useful plank but because the democratic Left should have an agenda for making this happen.

The Left must acknowledge, become aware and study carefully the contradictions that traverse the police apparatus, as any programme for police reform, however gradualist, critically depends on their exploitation. Such contradictions are engendered by both the social composition of police services as well as their institutional mission and history. The modern police is decidedly not an elitist institution: it recruits widely from popular social strata and therefore its organizational membership is by no means foreign to the conditions of everyday life, the problems and sensibilities of the people.¹¹⁹ The structure of police work involves a constant interfacing with these very same conditions and therefore it is untenable to think that these subjectivities are permanently and irreversibly alienated upon entering the police service. It must be understood that forging of an outlook of the police as an organization inimical to the people involves an extraordinary amount of effort to systematically indoctrinate its membership into the ideologies that organize the apparatus. Much of this is achieved through practice. They are instructed to crush strikes, smash protests and form up phalanxes against today's social movements. But a significant aspect of understanding such deployments concerns appreciating

116 Richard V. Ericson and Clifford D. Shearing, „The Scientification of Police Work,” Pp. 129-59 *The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations*, eds. G. Böhme and N. Stehr (Dordrecht: D. Reidl, 1986).

117 Patricia Ewick, „Corporate Cures: The Commodification of Social Control,” *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society* 13 (1993): 137-5, Ian Loader, „Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security,” *Sociology* 33 (1999): 373-9, Rigakos, „Hyperpanoptics as Commodity: The Case of the Parapolice,”

118 After a critical lecture on modern surveillance, one of Rigakos' students once asked him the following question: “What does the Left intend to do about city-centre surveillance cameras after a democratic revolution?” A fair question to which almost no consideration has been given by progressive scholars. Rigakos responded, “Well, what is the material, ideological and social necessity for removing them?” The point is that these types of pertinent questions have been entirely ignored by Leftist thinkers.

119 Marx and Engels were wrong when they attributed reactionary violence from Bonapartists and other counter-revolutionaries as emanating from the lumpen and criminal classes. On the contrary, the evidence shows that they were rather recruited from the working classes who wanted the restoration of order. See: Bovenkerk, Frank. “The Rehabilitation of the Rabble: How and Why Marx and Engels Wrongly Depicted the Lumpen-proletariat as a Reactionary Force.” *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology/Sociologia Neerlandica* 20 1 (1984): 13-41.

the characteristic of all bureaucracies to neutralize external influences by means of ideological indoctrination, material rewards and the rationalization of organizational structures and practices.¹²⁰

The police are an essential component of the institutional apparatus of liberal democracy that must adhere to its principles and values. Yet while these principles of legality, due process, civil and human rights, equality, democratic rule and transparency are standards by which police activity is routinely measured both formally and informally, liberals do not own these principles. They are universal attributes of human aspiration that have simply been coopted into liberal discourse and tied to property rights.¹²¹ In many cases they have been appropriated from socialist struggles. They need not be set asunder by the democratic Left. In terms of policing they simply need to be pushed further and in alignment with principles of a new economic system within which policing will necessarily play an essential role.

Policing is controversial and prone to scandal precisely because there is an active contradiction between perfecting the repressive function of the police and the ideological structures by means of which consent of the masses is elicited in a capitalist society. This means that the general tools conducive to a democratization of the police apparatus are already readily available under conditions of liberal democracy. The point is not to appeal to those principles abstractly and in a defensive manner, but rather to bring them at the core and reshape them to suit the Left's political stance towards the police in both declaratory and practical terms. The Left cannot afford and should not aspire to be *anti-police*¹²² but it has a lot to gain by actively declaring and practically elaborating a vision for democratic policing.

A third contradiction stems from the fact that the police mandate is exceptionally wide. The police as a branch of the executive possess extensive discretion with regard to prioritizing one or another aspect of that mandate. All modern political battles surrounding policing, from the older concerns about police effectiveness to the wave of community policing reforms to the present day post-crash hardening of police presence and response have regarded wrestling political control over that executive discretion. Yet it is often the case that the use of that discretion is guided by emergency, hence a recourse to force. Only a small fraction of police work conducted on an everyday basis involves direct coercion. This is not to underestimate the political pertinence of the coercive function of the police—after all, the practical political experience of the Left very much attests to that. However, to structure the entire programme of the Left around that experience is the least productive approach politically. The police use force, but the use of force is not the central characteristic of its contribution to peaceful social coexistence: by providing service, mediation, arbitration and reassurance the police constitute a wide-ranging practical problem-solving mechanism for the majority of citizens in everyday life. For the Left, a much more fruitful political approach would be to openly declare which areas of police activity must be prioritised over others, and pursue a political programme that actively puts pressure on the police to act in that direction.

At the level of principles, the Left must make a firm commitment to the protection of *public safety* as the primary rationale for policing. Among a range of possible definitions of the police mission, public safety is the most readily definable as a preoccupation with the minimization of harmful outcomes in the course of everyday life and within the contours of established institutional and constitutional guarantees of freedom, equality and democracy.¹²³ A priority on public safety entails a preoccupation

120 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft Und Gesellschaft*, (Tr. As *Economy and Society*), trans. G. Roth and G. Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1922/1968)

121 Borkenau, Franz. *Der Übergang Vom Feudalen Zum Bürgerlichen*. 1934. Weibilt, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976.; Woodiwiss, Anthony. *Human Rights*. Milton Park, UK: Psychology Press, 2005.

122 Except in the abstract sense of interrogating the development of the *idea* of police and its embeddedness with modern capitalism.

123 "Public" safety, it should nonetheless be noted, has its limitations. It does not appear to actively recognize private violence often perpetuated in the home and seems to reify the distinction between public life and private troubles. But our point would be that, because the idea of harm is inherently open to politicisation, such private harms can and must be colonized by a notion of public safety as part of a Left strategy.

with the *material and subjective* conditions for peaceful coexistence on the basis of wide consensus and adherence to a principle of minimum necessary intervention. Public safety therefore delineates policing as a *public good* which must be universally and democratically distributed not only without distinction or discrimination based on gender, race or social status, but also in close cooperation and consultation with the citizenry.

Public safety provides a definition of the police mission that does not engender a permanent tendency for the usurpation of power by the police bureaucracy, as, for example, notions of state security do,¹²⁴ but rather instills an aspiration to alleviate its unequal distribution in society. While the above may entail an intensification of police activity in certain domains of social life, they also entail a relative withdrawal of the police force from others. In these cases wider forms of consultation and negotiation should become the established procedure towards achieving regulation: industrial disputes being a prime example. But remember also that a truly socialist government would have little need to deploy the police as strike breakers because the capitalist-worker distinction will disintegrate as worker-owned enterprises begin to flourish. On behalf of whom will the police enforce wage labour when the wage labour system begins to evaporate? More contemporaneously, a number of consequences for the organization, standards and deployment of the police service flow from this fundamental principle of public safety, and they will be elaborated in the remainder of this section.

6.2 Re-define the police professional

An explicit commitment to public safety as the defining core of the police mission would entail a significant reconfiguration of the mentalities and modes of work of police personnel. Historically, the provenance of many police bodies and their adherence to principles of bureaucratic organization have entailed that police organizations have been modelled on the template of the military—the archetypical modern bureaucracy. The typical out-

look of contemporary police bodies is uniformed, often armed, with an emphasis on organizational rules and regulations governing conduct, procedure, discipline and personnel coordination. Even where variations exist, they are often the product of a conscious effort at a distancing from the military template. It is true that where police structures akin to military ones did not occur via a process of historical development, police reformers turned to such models looking to reinforce the coherence of the police organization to reduce the impact of external influence and instil public confidence to the police.¹²⁵

But the war metaphor, it seems, has taken over reality—the metaphor of war, on crime, on drugs, on terrorism and so on, has been naturalized in police vocabulary and mentalities. This is not to say that the police have not always been understood as part of the war apparatus, only that their use and deployment in this manner has never been so overt and unabashed in modern history.

From an organizational viewpoint, this model aims to establish effective steering from top to bottom by means of centralization, performance measures, and the development of elaborate rules of conduct and procedure and ultimately disciplinary action. It has engendered a constant preoccupation with technology, the introduction and deployment of ever more sophisticated hardware, from weapons, to communication systems to IT intended to maximise operational effectiveness and efficiency. Importantly, it has reinforced the notion that police affairs can and should be managed effectively on the basis of internal procedures, in separation from regular and extensive external input or oversight. Additionally, all these characteristics have been deeply ingrained in systems of training and career progression and are thus reproduced and perpetuated at the organizational level and in police mentalities.

To be sure, the external influences contributing to the reproduction of this model cannot be easily dismissed. The modern police have clear and strong connections with what today can be called the security-industrial complex. Budget restraints and the

124 Mark Neocleous, *Critique of Security* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008)

125 Clive Emsley, *The English Police : A Political and Social History*, 2ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf ; St. Martin's Press, 1991, Clive Emsley, „A Typology of Nineteenth Century Police,“ *Deviance et Societe* 3.1 (1999): 29-44

perpetuation of fiscal crisis call for organisational efficiencies and ‘streamlining’. A tendency towards legalism is underpinned by the very institutional position of the police and the desire to establish controls over this critical branch of the executive. But the undesirable consequences of militarism and bureaucratism in police organization are well recognized today. Militarism contributes to the proliferation of confrontational styles, authoritarianism and excessive force.¹²⁶ Bureaucratism encourages shortcuts and the emergence of informal systems of rules¹²⁷ only accessible to and understood by insiders (the notorious ‘police culture’).¹²⁸ The considerable adverse effects on the personal wellbeing of police personnel have also been clearly recognised. Ultimately, the dominant model of police organization stifles initiative and creativity, particularly where it is most needed, that is, in the delivery of police service by front-line personnel.

An explicit priority on public safety repositioning the role of the police as a mechanism for the facilitation of peaceful coexistence within the framework of constitutional guarantees and freedoms entails a drastic shift in the definition of the core police technology. It thus entails a re-envisioning of the police service, bringing the qualities and abilities of police personnel at the forefront of considerations of strategy, design and modes of delivery. In short, it calls for a new ideal of police professionalism, nurturing the mediational and restorative qualities of the police role and the development across the membership of the police organisation of social awareness, expertise, initiative and sound decision making according to widely accepted and agreed standards. This position is by no means a call for a new type of technocracy—it rather flows from the realization that the present state of thinking about the police severely lags behind from a recognition that in the social division of labour police work

primarily constitutes intellectual labour. Militarism and bureaucracy have provided flawed notions of police professionalism and scientific police precisely because they suppress that reality. This is also why the development of a police professionalism that resembles that of other professions have been partial and incomplete across police organizations across contexts.

A move towards building up a new type of professional autonomy of the police mean to establish, encourage and strengthen certain minimum key characteristics of professionalism among the membership of the police organization: a reference to a developing body of knowledge, a code of conduct, the establishment of professional associations and a concern about the active and continuing development of skills and abilities pertaining to the valorization of the above knowledge in the interfacing of the police with the citizenry. Indeed, this problem-solving, diagnostic approach to professional development needs to be inculcated as part of the police officer’s initial training.

While it is true that some of these elements are already present in some contexts, police activity is typically determined by bureaucratic prerogative, top-down decision-making and tradition rather than evidence-based practice that is open to deliberation, dialogue and innovation. It is doubtful whether a universal path towards the establishment and strengthening of these characteristics can exist.

At a minimum, nurturing a new type of professionalism would mean that organizational structures must be conducive to the production and evaluation of pertinent knowledge and information; information flows between police organization and the community and also between different sections of the police organization must become *genuinely reciprocal*; the police must become organically integrated into the wider circuits of knowledge production regarding the life and welfare of the communities they police; a code of conduct reflecting the resolution of issues on the basis of core principles and the evolution of collective experience must take precedence over strictly organizational considerations; structures and procedures allowing not only recruitment and initial training according to high standards, but also continuous career-long,

126 Peter Kraska, *Militarizing the american criminal justice system* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001); William Geller and Hans Toch, *Police violence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

127 David J. Smith and Jeremy Gray, *Police and people in London IV: the police in action* (London: PSI, 1983).

128 For an outline of the idea of police culture and its implications in police practice see Jerome Skolnick and James Fyfe, *Above the law: police and the excessive use of force* (New York: Free Press, 1993)

university-based learning and training must be introduced.

As we have already noted, the potentially critical contribution of police unions must also be fully acknowledged. Today, when unions enjoy institutional legitimacy and formal recognition, they are at best pursuing a role in defending the occupational rights and conditions of work and pay of their members. In the public sphere, they are forced into the straightjacket of managing the image and other consequences of the occupational isolation engendered by the prevailing police models. The fact remains that police unions are best placed to represent the collective experience of police personnel and to handle critical discrepancies among categories of police personnel in terms of gender, race and even rank. Not only should their growth should be encouraged but police unions should be fully integrated into the circuits of professional development both within the police organization and in collaboration with external agencies.

6.3 Establish a dense network of external controls

As we have indicated, democratizing the police entails an institutional redesign that renders the police more responsive and more accountable to those receiving the police service. At the level of constitutional principle, the police are positioned as a branch of the executive and are thus subject to the system of checks and balances that typically characterizes the organization of powers in liberal democratic polities. The police are subject to the laws governing their activity and it is for the courts to decide whether a violation of the law has occurred in the course of police activity. This general configuration of power typically allows a considerable margin of discretion to police organizations. Those higher up in the hierarchy of the executive can lay down the strategic goals and targets for the service but it is typically for the police to decide on the particular goals, means and methods they deem necessary for carrying out their mission and duties. Judicial scrutiny is retrospective. One of the consequences of prevailing notions of police professionalism is the idea that the police have the responsibility and the right to manage their domain of activity

and that this can and should be achieved by means of internal rules and procedures. The influence of external agencies is undesirable and whenever it is exerted, it is seen as an intrusion.

This general regime grants the police operational independence in principle, even though its precise margins can vary across jurisdictions. It is of course possible to adjust the institutional design around the police in order to achieve tighter strategic control, whether on police activity as such, by developing further the system of legal rules governing it, or police organizations more generally, by setting out more elaborate targets or installing budgetary controls and so on. On the other hand, courts can play an important role precisely by adjudicating on conditions governing the application of legal norms pertaining to police activity. These paths of exerting control over police activity are constitutionally sanctioned, well established and, depending on the particular context, they have proven to be largely effective, particularly under conditions of heightened popular pressure. But the problem with the solutions emerging from these paths is that they tend to be reactions to issues that have become highly visible and widely acknowledged. They do not necessarily ensure the higher levels of responsiveness and accountability desirable for democratic policing in so far as they are less likely to bring about lasting organizational and cultural change. There is a difficult balance to be achieved that involves the retention of a healthy concept of police professionalism and the challenging of the police managerial prerogative under conditions of liberal democracy.

One of the absolute requisites for democratic reform has to do with the recognition that the problems of policing are not technical issues to be decided by experts and technocrats. If the purpose of policing is to ensure the conditions of peaceful coexistence in society, then the questions of values, interests and priorities it involves must be resolved politically by an informed and empowered citizenry.¹²⁹ This requires consistently high levels of transparency, firstly in the sense that detailed information about the methods and outcomes of police activity must be widely available. Although

129 Ruben Rumbaut and Egon Bittner, "Changing conceptions of the police role: a sociological review," *Crime and Justice* 1 (1979): 239–298

some jurisdictions do better in this respect, the norm is that the volume and detail of available information are nowhere near the levels necessary to assist citizens reach informed views about the issues the police are dealing with or the outcomes of their actions. In fact, both principles of sound administration and the public interest in the above sense dictate the need for extensive reporting. This is particularly the case with aspects of police activity that are by definition controversial or are known to be characterized by biases, such as the use of force or stop and search. Pertinent measures of police activity at various levels must be agreed on the basis of the widest possible political and technical consensus and the relevant data in statistical and in narrative form must be freely available and accessible publicly without the need of freedom of information requests. Particularly in areas of activity which the police deem necessary to prioritise on the basis of strategic considerations, every interested member of the public must be able to access information evidencing the need for the particular allocation of human and material resources to that end.

Decentralization is key for enhancing the local responsiveness and accountability of the police. If a requisite of democratic policing is that police forces cannot be insular or cut-off from the communities that they police, an idea that has gained renewed prominence under the rubric of community policing in the past thirty years, it only follows that structures of police governance must possess the capacity to steer police priorities in accordance to local needs. Even systems featuring national police forces incorporate elements allowing strategies articulated at national and organization-wide level to be adapted or adjusted to local conditions. The question is the extent to which the prerogative of the centre is to be preserved. Undoubtedly, certain strategies will be better served and economies of scale will be achieved more easily by the retention of a number of centralized units, particularly support and training units. Therefore, structures of democratic accountability with a national remit would be more relevant than local ones. However, as the bulk of police services are delivered locally, there is much scope for local structures of police steering and accountability to be given the widest possible control over local police forces or formations.

A democratic Left programme for police reform could, depending on the characteristics of the particular context in each case, be built around the democratization and expansion of police boards or councils articulated at the levels of national and local government and embodying the general idea of a 'tripartite' system. A national policing board will oversee the strategic planning of the police service at the national level, and be given the responsibility and authority to define strategic goals, policies and guidelines regarding the development, performance, training and funding of the police service, and also to control appointments at the highest level of police hierarchy where a national structure exists. It will have the responsibility to coordinate other national bodies involved in the monitoring of police activities or the implementation of policies pertaining to crime prevention, criminal justice or social control, such as a national police complaints authority, the prosecution service and so on.

The national policing board will also have the responsibility for accreditation and monitoring of security providers such as worker-cooperative security firms, part-time or volunteer police or agencies involved in police training and establishing a budget for such services in maintaining public safety.¹³⁰ This board should be composed of the relevant ministers (justice and/or interior), the serving police leadership, members appointed by the parliament, representatives of the judiciary as well as representatives of other pertinent national bodies, including police and other trade unions or professional bodies so as to increase input from civil society. The board will be guaranteed levels of staffing and infrastructure adequate to support the elaboration, monitoring and evaluation of policies.

Local police boards will be the corresponding structures at the local level, having the responsibility to articulate strategies, policies and guidelines for local police bodies and also to monitor and evaluate their implementation. It will control the

¹³⁰ A similar system was recommended to the Canadian parliament in 2006. See: Law Commission of Canada. *In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada*. Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2006. Available here: https://www.academia.edu/5948411/In_Search_of_Security_The_Future_of_Policing_in_Canada

allocation of funds and also the appointment of local police leadership. There is no reason why a competitive system should not be created for these appointments on the basis of qualifications and the personal vision of candidates who will originate from the body of serving police officers holding an appropriate rank. Local boards will consist of members representative of the local government, the serving local police leadership, the leadership of the local judiciary and it can be more tightly integrated into the life and needs of the local community by including a directly elected element rather than representatives of local associations who can retain a consultative role.

Independent scrutiny of the police can be achieved at the national and local level with the introduction of parallel structures of citizen oversight, authorized to review and investigate police misconduct and complaints against the police more generally. These civilian oversight bodies should also be able to receive complaints from police officers, acting as a mechanism to deal with police executive malfeasance or harassment against front line officers. It is a technical matter whether these bodies will constitute a discrete component of the police board or a separate public body—the critical element is the possibility and guarantee of independent review enabling these bodies to investigate cases and evaluate practices from the viewpoint of rights and fairness in a timely fashion, with full cooperation of the police and without the restrictions typically present in judicial procedure. Considerable experience has been accumulated in the area of citizen oversight, which allows a variety of technical solutions regarding the precise remit, organization and procedures—including guarantees for the rights individual police officers—of such bodies.¹³¹

Internal police procedures must be adjusted to integrate with these external controls. Both external control systems and the police internally have the responsibility to oversee police activity in accordance with the same system of principles and guarantees established by the constitutional order and it is clearly in the best interest of police organizations to ensure that both legal standards and public

expectations are met. The problem with internal disciplinary procedures is that they are reactive and only effective at the level of individual officers. While this is an important and well-established form of accountability, our call for an intensification of data gathering regarding police activity and the thickening of external monitoring and controls would facilitate the introduction of internal procedures more conducive to organizational change and operating in a proactive fashion too. There is now good evidence that more intensive and comprehensive personnel assessment systems can lead to the early identification of issues not only at the level of individual officers but also across the organization. Such systems not only allow a less punitive, less disciplinary approach towards officer misconduct but they can also be tied to systems of internal rewards and the development of good (or ‘best’) practice guidelines. The available evidence points to positive outcomes on the quality of police service, as well as to positive impact on the nature and quality of personnel supervision.

Our final point is that all the above steps are synergistic: existing police organizational structures and established procedures are deeply rooted in the institutional reality of contemporary liberal democracies and cannot be simply by-passed. The point of strategy for the democratic Left is to exploit all possible avenues towards the strategic goal of a more transparent, responsive and accountable police system.

6.4 Implement democratic restructuring

If the call to democratize the police has as its end the creation of a police service that is more responsive and answerable police service to the people, it also aims at the creation of a police organization that is more responsive to the needs and aspirations of its own people. It is doubtful whether a system of democratic external controls will alone suffice to engender lasting and profound organizational and cultural change in the police, if it is not complemented with a bold and wide-ranging challenging of the characteristics of traditional bureaucracy that still prevail in police organization. A Left strategy for police reform calls for a generalized paradigm change that entails a drastic departure from the

131 Samuel Walker, *The new world of police accountability* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005).

traditional approaches to which the average police bureaucracy adheres. But the success of such change will depend heavily on how it will be translated into operational concepts and managerial structures that can be understood, supported and, ultimately, embraced by police personnel.

The approach we have outlined so far carries certain unambiguous consequences for police organization, in so far as we envisage a more intensive and extensive interfacing of the frontline police personnel with the citizenry within a decentralized system in which the production of security is not monopolized by the police. To put it bluntly, such a vision cannot be put to action by the traditional paramilitary police bureaucracy, which is designed as a system of hierarchical control aiming to maximise control and neutralise external influences. The results of the implementation of community policing to date, which has been hailed as the most important contemporary innovation in policing and similarly calls for an increased reliance on the community, greater discretion to front line officers and decentralized structures, offer clear indications that the traditional police organisational structure can be considerably resistant to such changes.

Models of community policing and restorative justice offer a compelling progressive vision for the restructuring of police organizations precisely because they involve a shifting of the focus of police work to the performance of socially useful work and problem solving in close collaboration with the citizenry. Accordingly, organizational structures must adjust to accommodate a broader view of police function that recognizes the importance of and assigns legitimacy to order maintenance, social service and general assistance beyond the traditional focus on law enforcement. The pursuit of such a strategy would entail considerable power shifts within the police organization firstly due to the introduction of much higher levels of decentralization of authority and responsibility towards front line personnel. Patterns of work and supervision as well as the allocation of resources must be adjusted to allow front line personnel teams to work in close cooperation with citizens and other stakeholders in the neighbourhood or the community and to develop approaches and solutions appropriate to

local conditions.¹³² This entails that line officers are granted higher levels of discretion in both the management of their own work and also their decision making while supervisors must tolerate and even encourage the exercise of such discretion. These patterns of delivery of the police service correspond to the decentralised structures of police governance thus leading to higher levels of differentiation and responsiveness to local needs. This model does not negate the uniform enforcement of legal and ethical rules governing police activity but rather places the emphasis on preventive action and on a deliberate focus on generating responses to substantive problems in the community.

Additional adjustments to the organizational structures may involve a reduction (flattening) of the layers of hierarchy in the police organization in order to improve flexibility, project-based work and the more fluid integration of community police units with other pertinent agencies in the implementation of local strategies. A change in this direction may also entail a degree of despecialization, either in the form of a direct reduction of the number of specialized units or in the form of a widening of the remit of specialized units towards crime prevention and problem solving. Despecialization does not mean dilution of skills and experience, but rather facilitates the nurturing of a more generalist type of police officer who will be more knowledgeable about the local community, its people and its problems. What is intended is a more strategic and deliberate organizational design that focuses on substantive outcomes rather than functional differentiation according to formalistic criteria.

A more gradualist approach ensuring that coalitions between the political leadership and the police are built and that each step in the introduction of changes in role descriptions, work methods and supervision styles will be clearly communicated and supported by training, in-house research to identify issues and appropriate adjustments in performance assessment and reward structures will also be nec-

132 See, for example, Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, *The new blue line: police innovation in six american cities* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); David Weisburd, Jerome McElroy and Patricia Hardyman, "Challenges to supervision in community policing: observations on a pilot project." *American Journal of Police* 7 2 (1988): 29-50.

essary—it cannot be assumed that drastic organizational changes can be simply decreed, particularly in contexts where paramilitaristic police bureaucracies are firmly entrenched.

6.5 Facilitate citizen participation

The strengthening and generalization of structures aiming at encouraging and strengthening citizen participation in police decision-making is a necessary complement for achieving organizational change in the delivery of the service. The overall aim is to enhance the rapport of front-line policing with already existing citizen activism, to encourage a greater number of citizens to participate in the identification of issues and the formulation of responses, and finally to introduce an element of direct citizen involvement in the delivery of the police service itself.

The decentralized, geographically focused structure of front-line police units should be matched with the development of more formal structures at the same geographical level in which police and citizens can meaningfully consult with each other. These structures can take the form of regular open meetings, attended by residents of a particular area, representatives of any local NGOs or other activist organizations, operational police officers as well as representatives of local government and other relevant agencies. A formal record of the discussions held during these meetings should be made and the issues should be formally followed up in subsequent meetings with all sides giving an account of the actions and approaches taken in response to these issues.

Private policing providers with a significant local presence should also be invited to participate and align the delivery of their services with locally agreed approaches. The accumulated experience indicates that the most significant challenge in the implementation of such initiatives is the level of public participation, both in quantitative terms and as regards the extent to which the composition of the citizen group in attendance is representative of the local population. Some formalization of the meetings (e.g. regular venues and times), guarantees of openness and informality and wide publicity could be ways to increase participation and coun-

teract apathy. Police participation in these meetings will not suffice in assessing local community needs but neighbourhood meetings should be approached as a genuine decision-making structure in which relevant information can be communicated and reviewed reciprocally. The police should be aiming to maximize input and provide technical support to the deliberations of those meetings; for example, the implementation of planned actions should be actively backed and monitored by the local crime analysis unit.

A conscious effort should be made to ensure that the articulation of a geographically focused system of police service also includes elements of direct citizen involvement up to the level of civilianizing some components of the local police organization. Neighbourhood watch schemes have been popular in various contexts and can prove useful for facilitating the implementation of local schemes or enhancing communication flows between the public and the police. Local schemes may also benefit from volunteering which may even extend to the staffing of partnership structures or even some local police services according to local conditions.

Finally, serious consideration should be given to the development of an auxiliary operational component recruited directly from the local population, drawing inspiration from special constable systems that exist in various countries. Auxiliaries and part-time police, if given training and allowed to be more tightly integrated with operational police units, can be a cost-effective way to boost the delivery of local police service and at the same time they open up possibilities for a higher degree of diversification, awareness and responsiveness and build a structural integration between police and the public. Every effort should also be made to allow their integration into the existing police union system with adequate democratic voice. The more diversified and integrated with the community both the police and their associations become the better for democratic policing in the long term.

6.6 Engage directly with private policing

The private security industry is omnipresent in everyday life and a series of factors, including

strong policy preferences to privatization, continue to underpin its growth.¹³³ There is significant variation across national contexts regarding the level of acceptance and legitimacy of private security services and the extent to which they are regulated. The expansion of the availability of private security services for functions, beyond specialized ones, akin to those performed by public police means that they are established today as an discrete and important component of the production of security in society.

Both market penetration and the structure of the industry, which beyond the big corporate entities typically also includes a considerable number of SMEs, entail that a democratic Left programme for reform in the area of public safety cannot simply reaffirm the primacy of public policing. Even though the democratization and strengthening of the delivery of public police service may potentially temper the levels of demand and reliance on private security, many functions will unavoidably remain part of private policing work. Additionally, a new approach in the allocation of police resources is likely to redefine the position and rationalize the involvement of private security, particularly in the process of the procurement of technical equipment and systems as well as the contracting out of services.

The model we propose would involve a much more active role of the state in the regulation of the private security industry, aiming to ensure both that the industry conforms to quality standards and that it delivers its services in ways that do not contradict the aims and the delivery of the public police service. As mentioned, national police governance structures must incorporate a mechanism and implement a system of accreditation and quality assurance for the private security industry. In many cases the service provided by private security companies is labour intensive and this typically has a negative

impact on standards of training, on procedures, and on conditions of work and pay for employees. Regulation should define what functions private policing can perform and under what principles and conditions, and also cover the identification, appearance, procedures and tactics of private security personnel. A clear regime of accountability should also be established, as private security activity can be less transparent. This system should be extended to monitor the enforcement of standards on in-house security where it exists, since some organizations are likely to develop their own provision and thus attempt to escape regulation. This is easily corrected within an appropriate regulatory regime.

Another vital step would be to encourage the development of alternative industry structures aiming to instil a degree of democratization and promote better standards of service. While the established norm is that private security is entrepreneurial and thus governed by the logic of profit maximization, there is no reason why state policies should not actively encourage the creation of worker cooperatives, subject to the same regulatory regime but allowing members direct control over training, procedures and quality of service. Cooperatives are known to be more enduring structures, they are driven by the common interests of their members and when they are operated locally they are also likely to be more responsive to community conditions and needs. Cooperatives, exactly because of their nature, would be brought more easily into partnership schemes for the delivery of local police services and offer better standards of service, transparency and accountability. Moreover, such cooperatives undercut the dominant model of capitalist policing and surplus-value in the process.¹³⁴

133 Spitzer, Steven, and Andrew T. Scull. "Privatization and Capitalist Development: The Case of the Private Police." *Social Problems* 25 (1977): 18-29.; Johnston, Les. *The Rebirth of Private Policing*. London: Routledge, 1992.; Jones, Trevor, and Tim Newburn. *Private Security and Public Policing*. New York: Oxford/Clarendon, 1998.; Shearing, Clifford D. "Unrecognized Origins of the New Policing: Linkages between Private and Public Policing." *Business and Crime Prevention*. Eds. Felson, Marcus and Ronald V. Clarke. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1997. 219-30.

134 Security contracts are typically exempt.

7.0 Democratizing the Hellenic Police

The aim of this section is to briefly consider the Greek context specifically and, in light of the preceding analysis, to develop a set of programmatic goals for police reform in Greece. A Left strategy for police reform in Greece must deal with a series of obstacles that are both objective and subjective. On the one hand, the police have historically served as a key instrument of authoritarianism in Greece in its various royalist, outright dictatorial or reactionary forms. Tight control of the police by these regimes has resulted in an organization which has proven particularly resistant to reform. On the other hand, the long history of right-wing partisanship by the police has equally resulted in a long history of well-earned Left-wing hostility against them. Beyond entrenched militarism and bureaucratism, these relations present an additional structural obstacle for the democratic reform of the police in the sense that the very possibility of reform is likely to be a contested issue not merely among the general public but also among sizeable segments of the Left.

A further recent difficulty arises from the active role that the police have assumed in suppressing popular dissent against the ongoing extreme austerity programme implemented by the right-wing government under the superintendence of the IMF-ECB-European Commission 'troika'. Political polarization in Greece appears to be fostering increased levels of extreme-right (Golden Dawn) influence among front-line police personnel,¹³⁵ and compelling evidence of police and Golden Dawn complicity have repeatedly surfaced in the national and international media.¹³⁶ While this suggests that

the police are typically unresponsive to popular pressure for reform in any case, it also means that various segments of the police apparatus will likely particularly resist a police reform programme by any government of the Left.

7.1 History

The current police system in Greece features a single national police force, the Hellenic Police. Responsible for core police services as well as state security functions throughout the Greek territory except ports (which are under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard), the Hellenic Police is an organization distinguished by military hierarchy, and disciplinary organization in the tradition of Continental gendarmeries. It is a service of the Ministry for Public Order and the Protection of the Citizen, which is a branch of the Executive separate from the Ministries of Defence and of Justice.

Historically, the Hellenic Police originated from the merger of Greece's oldest and largest police force, the Gendarmerie (1833–1984) and the more recent City Police (1920–1984). The former was established immediately after Greece became a sovereign state in 1833 by the Regency regime along the lines of the French gendarmerie. The militarized, bureaucratic and hierarchical organization of this body proved a key tool for consolidating state sovereignty and the pacification of the countryside, particularly for the suppression of local revolts and banditry. The latter, had been the result of the work of a British police mission to Greece and emerged as a response to the modernization of policing in the rapidly developing urban centres in the first quarter of the 20th century. Formed as a "civil police" force along the lines of the Metropolitan Police in London, it represented a conscious effort at a distancing from the gendarmerie style of policing. Despite initial plans its jurisdiction remained limited to only a few major urban centres (excluding Thessaloniki).

While the City Police retained values and standards aspiring to police professionalism, it too be-

¹³⁵ Georgios Papanicolaou and Ioannis Papageorgiou, "The Police and the Politics of the Extreme Right in Greece," *41st Annual Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control* (2013), vol.

¹³⁶ Sarantakos, G, and Maria Psara, "The Black Column of Golden Dawn Inside the Hellenic Police," *Ethnos*, 25 November 2012; Mason, Paul, "Alarm At Greek Police 'Collusion' With Far-Right Golden Dawn," *BBC News* (2012); Kalyviotou, Maria, "Golden Dawn in the Role of Riot Police Vanguard," *I Avgi* (2009); Chatzistefanou, Aris, "Golden Dawn Has Infiltrated Greek Police, Claims Officer," *Guardian.co.uk* (2012).

came progressively assimilated by the pervasive repressive orientation of Greek policing and its close interweaving with political power centres. The emphasis on national security and political surveillance of the population throughout the post-civil war period significantly shaped the Greek police.¹³⁷

These characteristics became untenable after the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy in 1974, particularly after the PASOK socialist party came to power in 1981. The amalgamation of the two forces placed the new unitary police force under the direct control of a political authority (Ministry of Public Order), aiming clearly to prevent the survival of the police mechanism as a relatively autonomous power centre. Since 1984 however, it is doubtful whether key structures, which determine the organizational and functional orientation, the operational choices and professional attitude of the staff have been modified successfully by the 1984 reform. Ultimately, in 2000 new legislation by the same PASOK party restored the institutional autonomy of the police by reinstating a separate police staff (the Hellenic Police Headquarters) as an independent command authority of the police.¹³⁸

7.2 Structure

The Hellenic Police comprises central and regional units and it is organized hierarchically in terms of both its administration and the geographical

distribution of its services.¹³⁹ The internal division of labour and responsibilities also reflects this hierarchical cascading. For example, a directorate with a particular area of responsibility operating at a central unit has a coordinating or supervisory role over regional units conducting operations in the same area of responsibility. As the force's top staff formation, the Greek Police Headquarters is the superior authority of all other services. It plans, directs, monitors and controls the activity of all police services and has overall responsibility for their operation. Other central units exist but their remit is specific to logistical support, police training and technical or scientific support of police operations (e.g. forensic laboratories), or, in the case of Office of Internal Affairs, to internal investigations across the organization. All other formations except those explicitly designated as central are designated as Regional Services and constitute the operational branch of the Hellenic Police. Their jurisdiction is also defined geographically and largely follows the general patterns of the territorial organization of Greek administration into regions, regional departments, municipalities and municipal departments. Accordingly, there are 14 General Police Directorates, which include their own staff formations as well as territorially distributed subdivisions, departments and stations. Special regulations apply to the organization of the General Police Directorates of Attica and Thessaloniki, due to the population size and heterogeneity of the operating environment of these regions.

From an organizational point of view, there has been a clear tendency since 1984 towards the development of additional staff formations and strategic units both centrally and at the regional level. Particularly since the 1990s this trend has been complemented by the creation of new special units at central and regional level by means of upgrading

137 George S. Rigakos, and Georgios Papanicolaou, "The Political Economy of Greek Policing: Between Neoliberalism and the Sovereign State," *Policing and Society* 13, no. 3 (2003); Sofia Vidali, *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. A' and B')* (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers (in Greek), 2007).

138 Sofia Vidali, *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy, Vols. A' and B'* (Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas (in Greek), 2007); Georgios Papanicolaou, "Greece," in *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Trevor Jones, and Tim Newburn (London: Routledge, 2006).

139 In what follows we do not take into account the recent law 4249/2014, which, by and large, reshuffles the already established characteristics of the Hellenic Police organization and reinforces the operational autonomy of its various branches. The implementation of the bulk of the changes introduced by this legislation depends on secondary legislation, which is reportedly under preparation by the Ministry of Public Order. The government's initiative appears to be rather precarious and has been met with severe criticism by the police unions.

or restructuring existing units, such as the establishment of the Department of Special Police Controls, the evolution of the Border Guards branches into Illegal Immigration Control Departments, the establishment of the Directorate of Special Crimes of Violence (anti-terrorist unit), the establishment of the Financial Police Department as an autonomous central unit and so on. These organizational changes do not merely reflect the increasing complexity of the operational environment of the Hellenic Police (the task of policing per se), but also the increasing complexity of relations of the police apparatus with the political leadership as well with international power centres influencing national approaches towards issue areas such as serious and organized crime or border controls.¹⁴⁰

With regard to matters of personnel, the hierarchical organization of the Hellenic Police is reflected in the rank structure, which corresponds to that of the Army. As such, special rules apply to the performance of police duties and discipline while police officers are legally presumed to be constantly on a state of alert. The general rules regarding the status and obligations of civil servants in other government branches do not apply to police personnel. Police officers are regularly armed while on duty.

Regular police officers constitute the main but not the only category of police personnel. The Hellenic Police employs civilian personnel who are either permanent staff or contracted to perform support and auxiliary roles, such as craftsmen, cleaners and so on. Different categories of police personnel exist. For more specialized support roles, such as medical care, IT support or forensics, special rules for qualifications and recruitment exist and these members of staff are also incorporated into the rank structure. Another special category originates from the bodies of Border Guards and Special Guards, which were established in the late 1990s but have been subsequently incorporated into the regular police staff. Border and Special Guards had been introduced as lower-cost solution to border controls and the protection of vulnerable infrastructure, installations and public buildings. At the time of their initial recruitment, special selection criteria applied,

prioritizing candidates with specific physique and military experience, and their training was fast-tracked. Additionally, the personnel of these special bodies were excluded from rank progression. After 2008 both categories were incorporated into regular police personnel as general duty police officers at the rank of constable. They were nevertheless not given the power to perform any tasks relating to preliminary investigation.¹⁴¹

Regular police personnel are divided into the categories of officers (Police Second Lieutenant to Police Lieutenant General rank) and non-commissioned officers (Police Constable to Police Sergeant). Different procedures exist for the recruitment of officers in each category and they are trained in separate police colleges. Since 1994 all personnel have been recruited via the higher education entrance national examination. The upwards mobility of non-commissioned personnel is restricted, as officers are either required to take a special entrance examination for admission to the Police Officers College or graduate from a special warrant officers school. A special examination is also required for the promotion to the rank of Police Sergeant. Although the introduction of examinations as a generalized procedure for recruitment and career progression is considered as an important step towards modernization, both training procedures and the criteria for rank progression have been criticized on a regular basis. This criticism is particularly common in connection with the training in Police Colleges where there is a continuing emphasis on discipline and military-style conditioning, while the actual curriculum has been criticized as far too formalistic and inflexible.¹⁴²

Police operations in Greece fall into two general categories according to the law. First, there is general policing, which pertains to the protection of public peace and order, and involves such activities as

140 Vidali, *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy (Vols. A' and B')*.

141 Rigakos, and Papanicolaou, "The Political Economy of Greek Policing: Between Neoliberalism and the Sovereign State."

142 Giorgos V. Papakonstantis, *Hellenic Police: Organization, Policy and Ideology* (Athens, Greece: Ant. N. Sakkoulas (in Greek), 2003); Evangelos Stergioulis, *The Greek Police After the Political Changeover (1975-1995)* (Athens, Greece: Nomike Vivliothike (in Greek), 2001); Giorgos V. Papakonstantis, *Proposals for the Reform of the Hellenic Police* (Athens: POASY (in Greek), 2011).

preventive patrol, public order policing, traffic regulation and so on. On the other hand, there is public and state security policing, which preponderantly pertains to criminal investigation. The police in this latter context may either independently initiate a preliminary investigation as soon as a crime has been reported, or they may conduct investigative activity in the course of a formal criminal investigation under the direction of the investigating judge. This functional differentiation of police activity as established by law traverses the organization of the Hellenic Police at central and regional levels and units are organized accordingly. As a result, this investigative distinction determines the degree of specialization of each unit and also defines internal practices, techniques, the use of technology, the working conditions of staff as well as their approach to contacts between the police and the public. The law regulates the types of police action explicitly and the police are expected to adhere to the principle of legality in the course of their activities. Nevertheless, practices, and, consequently, levels of discretion vary according to the position of each unit in the division of labour in the organization. General policing personnel are uniformed, required to carry specific equipment and use particular means in the performance of their duties defined in detailed regulations. On the other hand, security policing units operate under more relaxed conditions but the outcomes of their actions are more strictly scrutinized as they have to adhere to the provisions of penal procedure.

The performance of the two categories of police activity is externally driven by dynamics that cause some divergence in the organization. On one hand, since the early 1990s there has been a persistent emphasis on the public presence of the police, which is deemed to contribute to crime prevention and provide reassurance to the public. As a result, the Hellenic Police has experimented with reinforcing preventive patrol, neighbourhood policing schemes, and new types of public order units. In practice, the implementation of such efforts is heavily underpinned by the militarized outlook and mentality of the organization. This can be seen in the evolution of the deployment, appearance, equipment and operational tactics of the different types of either riot police or fast response units since the mid-1990s,

all of which are characterized by intensified paramilitarization. While there is little evidence about the preventive value of such developments, there are more indications that they lead to inefficiencies, strain human and material resources and further alienate the public. On the other hand, the development of specialized units dealing with financial and organized crime or terrorism has entailed the introduction of new methods or technologies in parts of the organization, but it has also rendered their activity less conducive to effective external scrutiny.

Structures of accountability in the Hellenic Police are internally managerial and externally heavily, if not exclusively dependent on judicial redress. Police misconduct is investigated internally according to disciplinary regulations but little information, if any, reaches the public with regard to levels and types of misconduct. The creation of an Internal Affairs unit in 1999 was hailed as an important step towards more effective scrutiny internally. However, the service is only required to present an annual report via the Minister of Public Order to a permanent parliamentary committee and little information is made available to the public. Whatever data are available typically fail to inform public debates, as these, to the extent that they occur, usually focus on incidents causing major public concern and not on wider issues. Furthermore, the Hellenic Police is subject to external scrutiny by the Greek Ombudsman, an independent authority established in 1998 who has the power to investigate any illegal actions or omissions of the police that citizens report. While possessing the power to investigate such actions, the Ombudsman at best offers an opportunity for mediation between public authorities and complainants, and any escalation of action must necessarily take the route of seeking judicial redress.¹⁴³

7.3 Current developments and the issue of Golden Dawn

The historical ties of the police with the political right in Greece should not be underestimated, and cannot be presumed to have laid dormant or inactive after 1974. Immediately after 1981 PASOK's

¹⁴³ Vidali, *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy* (Vols. A' and B').

initial policies can be seen as an attempt to suppress the relationship of the police with the political right as well as the conservative, 'deep-state' power centres operating within the police. However, the recent frequent instances of complicity between the police and Golden Dawn in the course of regular, everyday police operations (such as public order policing or even criminal investigation) indicates a renewed problem of a different order.

In Greece, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made to connect the convergence between the far right and structures of militarism and bureaucratism in the Hellenic Police, a likely avenue to illuminate the conditions that underpin Golden Dawn's popularity among rank-and-file police officers. Golden Dawn's public presence in recent years has developed along similar priorities as the police: crime and insecurity in urban areas, the influx of undocumented migrants, and popular resistance against austerity. Arguably, the current patterns of police deployment and the development of new tactics aiming to address those issues have resulted in the forging of practical alliances between front-line police units and Golden Dawn which goes beyond the question of extant connections between higher-ranking police personnel and far-right politicians. Golden Dawn's rhetorics appeal directly to the spontaneous ideology of police personnel which is already heavily skewed towards the right. As a result Golden Dawn has been increasingly seen by the police not only as 'part of the gang', but also as part of the solution in situations where front line patrol and emergency response police personnel are hard pressed to reassure a heavily agitated and polarized public.

Recent developments in Greek policing can be directly linked to this development.¹⁴⁴

First, the political leadership has adopted (with the acquiescence of police leaders) a peculiar mix of reassurance and suffocation in policing the inner city. The Hellenic Police already deploy a heavily militarized presence in Athens which has now become generalized with the addition of city centre of riot police squads in full equipment. The newly formed 2,500-strong patrol and emergency response unit

DIAS which relies exclusively on motorbikes has also become omnipresent in Athens and other large cities. The squad is armed and intended to provide 'rapid and combative intervention'. But heightened militarization and unstructured exposure to street conditions are likely to further alienate already strained personnel and entrench the stereotypes around which their outlook is already structured.

Second, the former Border Guards and Special Guards units have been fully incorporated within regular police ranks and are regularly assigned to regular city patrol units, including DIAS. As the background, training and career progression path of these individuals differs from those of regular police personnel, not only does it reinforce the militarizing tendencies of the Hellenic Police, arguably at the expense of training and socialization into professional policing standards,¹⁴⁵ but it also proving very fertile ground for Golden Dawn's message.

Third, the very stance of the political leadership of the Ministry of Public Order may be having an important legitimizing effect on police practices influenced or inspired by Golden Dawn. The (former) minister Mr. Dendias not only refused to inquire into or even verbally condemn the frequently reported incidents of police abuses, racist or other forms of harassment typically associated with Golden Dawn, but he also backed firmly the 'Xenios Zeus' police sweep operations against migrants. In the course of these stop and detain operations, large numbers of individuals of foreign origin are rounded up, and those found to be 'undocumented' are then detained at the immigration detention camps. Thus, serious concerns about racist and xenophobic police abuses are now widespread.¹⁴⁶

In short, some deep-rooted authoritarian characteristics within the Hellenic police apparatus have been further reinforced organizationally and by its leadership, while far-right influence consolidates the dominance of a reactionary *Weltanschauung* among personnel. Clearly, a change in the political message conveyed by the leadership of the Ministry of Public Order will not suffice to overturn the

¹⁴⁴ Papanicolaou, and Papageorgiou, "The Police and the Politics of the Extreme Right in Greece."

¹⁴⁵ Vidali, *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy* (Vols. A' and B').

¹⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Unwelcome Guests: Abusive Practices of the Hellenic Police Against Migrants in Athens* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013).

consequences of these current developments unless backed by a carefully implemented (and carefully timed) intervention in the structures of police governance and organization in the country. In Greece, the additional challenge is that a Left strategy for reform must at once check the advance of the far-right among police personnel *and* generate the conditions for a democratizing and thus opening up of these structures.

7.4 A Left strategy for police reform in Greece

Part of the problem for establishing a set of reform initiatives along the lines of a democratic Left in Greece is that the Hellenic Police, for the most part, have yet to be fully integrated within liberal democracy. It is surely easier to initiate change when, at the very least, the institution one is seeking to reform – at least in principle if not practice – proffers the narrative identity of non-partisanship and pluralism in their history and guiding mission. This is clearly not the case in Greece where we are witness to the ease with which Golden Dawn has ensconced itself among the police and the widespread support that the far right has enjoyed among officer rank-and-file. It might seem tempting in the aftermath of a Syriza General Election victory, to initiate a purge of the established police executive and declare the police on their way to reform – this would certainly be the *normal* course of affairs in Greek politics but it would not result in lasting and meaningful institutional reform.

Thus, while the Left must adopt an unambiguous set of principles guiding police reform in Greece, the precise nature and timing of each step will depend on the evaluation of existing conditions within the organization of the Hellenic Police. In some cases this can be as simple as merely modernizing elements that have little or nothing to do with a politics of police. In others, it will mean a philosophical shift in priorities and a wholesale change in how those priorities are identified in the first place.

The main challenge for the Left is to mobilize its political forces in the direction of engendering wider consensus among the public regarding the necessity of police reform and to create pertinent, strong alliances within the police organization. Po-

lice unions will be key to the latter goal and should be carefully conscripted in the formulation and the implementation of the reform program.¹⁴⁷ In fact, it would be far more permissible for a party of the Left to engage in sustained and overt political maneuvering at the union level than anywhere else and to use this as a method of leveraging reform throughout the Hellenic Police. In addition, the wider change in the social composition of police personnel since the mid-1990s can be assumed to entail that various segments of the police will be more willing to support reform pursuing a strengthening of new police professionalism under a different policing model. In short, any changes to be initiated must be accepted by rank and file officers as benefitting them directly and that their interests are furthered by advocating reform.

In line with the analysis in previous parts of this report, the implementation of such a program could take the following steps:

1. **Establish a research and strategic unit** guided by a team of experts, with extensive powers to collect, audit, report and share data on police activity and to monitor and evaluate police practice. This is, in no uncertain terms, an attempt to build an alternative police science that works toward the holistic decrease of harm and fosters a strong sense of public safety and democratic support for the police. It should have under its remit all crime analysis units and a decentralized executive mechanism. It should track crimes silenced by existing class-filtered measures including white-collar fraud, and political and corporate malfeasance. All new pilot projects and crime reduction plans should be assessed so that the future development of democratic policing initiatives can be evaluated and shared with policing boards, the public and

¹⁴⁷ This does not mean that the platform on which police unions typically campaign should be accepted unconditionally. In fact, the strategic documents adopted by POASY (the largest police union) appear to espouse changes of a technical nature rather than a more fundamental change of the policing model, see for example Greek Centre for Criminology, *Report on the Re-Structuring of the Services of the Hellenic Police* (Athens: Report commissioned by the Greek Federation of Police Officers. Sociology Department, Panteion University (in Greek), 2001). and Papakonstantis, *Proposals for the Reform of the Hellenic Police*.

police administrators. These should be made available electronically and the public should be made aware of routine police practices in their area through online reporting.

2. **Create a comprehensive and multi-tiered personnel system and database** including all existing records of experience, qualifications and discipline and establish a system of regular professional development planning and review for existing regular and new part-time and auxiliary services. Introduce 360-degree peer reviews as a discrete component of this system essential for promotion and annual or biannual review.
3. **Establish an updated system of regular mandatory retraining** as a distinct component of police academy training. Officers sent for retraining should be detached from their units and should be available for reassignment. Academy training should build awareness in recruits and existing rank-and-file of their duties as state “workers” and as members of an extended democratic policing network with obligations to the public and the Hellenic Constitution devoid of political partisanship. Political partisanship among the police should come to be viewed as a betrayal of democratic policing and the Hellenic Police.¹⁴⁸
4. **Establish the National Police Board** and bring the Hellenic Police under its immediate control. All remaining administrative services of the Ministry of Public Order should be distributed between the ministries of Interior and Justice. The police should be unshackled from military

hierarchies and national security issues as much as feasible..

5. **Commission a study for the restructuring and decentralization of the Hellenic Police** and launch a parallel consultation program under the authority of the National Police Board. Local police boards with democratic representation and some budgetary control to initiate crime prevention programs should be established at the end of this process. The existing rank structure of the police should be flattened and demilitarized as much as possible.
6. **Remove all paramilitary police units from regular service** in everyday policing and establish levels of staffing appropriate for a use of these units under the principle of ‘last resort’ and reassign superfluous personnel to fast response units and other decentralized services. Make extensive use of auxiliary and part-time policing to augment the Hellenic police as necessary, in the process structurally interposing career police with civilian parapolice.
7. As a necessary step toward the modernization of the Hellenic Police, **revise, harmonize and codify all existing primary and secondary legislation governing police powers** and activity and ensure that all subsequent legislative changes are made with reference to this codification. At the same time launch a consultation program leading to the revision of all regulations relating to workloading, overtime and other conditions of work within the police service. Invite the police union into a leading consultative role in this process.
8. **Review and revise the system of incentives and rewards applying to serving police personnel** and relate it to the outcomes of their professional development planning.
9. **Revise and codify all legislation regarding private security.** Update legislation and regulations as needed to provide structural and economic incentives toward the creation of competitive worker cooperative security firms. Ensure that all security guard licensing is tied to a proviso that no security guard may act at the behest of a private client that undermines the public interest.

These nine platforms for action are certainly not exhaustive and in any case crises of policing and

¹⁴⁸ There is an old practice in the French Foreign Legion that when legionnaires are asked the inevitable question “where are you from?” the response would always be “the Legion is my country” (see: Tony Geraghty, *March or Die: France and the French Foreign Legion* (Toronto: Grafton, 1986)). This has served as a powerful tool for putting distance between the legionnaire’s past and toward building solidarity and professional *esprit des corps* among legionnaires for over a century. One might imagine that a first step toward the political realignment of the Hellenic Police through an accelerated passage from partisan policing to a new police science would entail a similar sentiment of solidarity that similarly puts distance between its history and builds a new solidarity and identity. Thus, one might hope that when a Hellenic Police officer of the future is asked “what political party are you with?” the response ought to be “the Hellenic Police is my party.” This shibboleth certainly discredits any alignment with right-wing parties as an act of betrayal against the police service’s own sense of solidarity.

security are common for all governments, the immediacy of which are often distracting from long-term reform projects such as this one. This is to be expected but it should not stop the effort. What we have offered is skeletal. The specifics of the political, economic and social context will often mediate what is possible.

Appendix I:

A selective survey of national policing models

Rethinking and restructuring policing in the midst of the hegemony of security is a tremendous challenge but it is a challenge that must be met if the democratic Left is to build a vision for a post-crisis and post-capitalist future across Europe. This Appendix is designed to take account of the current state of affairs by beginning with a brief overview of police organisation and mechanisms of accountability in some selected jurisdictions that can be thought of as representative of a variety of existing police models.

We have already suggested that it is possible to discern certain key characteristics shared by policing systems in capitalist society, particularly under conditions of liberal democracy. The police function within the liberal democratic framework is constituted both as a core state activity, expressive of sovereign interests, and as a public good, to which every citizen is entitled. This general framework also allows for private policing arrangements in the sense that private individuals or legal persons are entitled legally to defend their interests against infractions and may choose to do so by contracting this function to a third party.¹⁴⁹

While it is true that one cannot understand the organization of policing in a capitalist economy without also examining the private policing sector,¹⁵⁰ in this Appendix we focus on the public police in order to best segment an approach that should encompass a policy for the reform of both. Public police organisations possess a wide remit to uphold domestic order, public safety and security by preventing or suppressing violations typically falling within the general domain of criminal law. But it is not unusual for police activity to extend

in the domain of state security engaging in activity against undesirable or subversive political activity.¹⁵¹ Experience shows that these two aspects of policing are closely intertwined, and this connection has once again been forcefully asserted in the aftermath of 9/11.¹⁵²

While the precise remit of and division of labour within police organisations is heavily dependent on national and institutional histories, our brief survey focuses on those aspects of police organisation and structures of accountability that bear heavily on the everyday experience of policing for the vast majority of citizens. Our concern is to interrogate certain key types of police systems, to establish whether there are characteristics more conducive to democratic control and accountability and under what conditions. The Swedish and French systems are representative of a 'continental' police model, while the English and US systems, while significantly different between each other, are representative of a more 'decentralised' police system. As we have seen, Greek policing is also a typical example of a 'continental' system.

Case 1: Sweden

Sweden features a state police service comprising agencies with territorial and national jurisdiction. The service consists of 21 territorial (county) police authorities, which are responsible for police operations in their respective jurisdictions. Each authority is directed by a chief commissioner and a local police board, all appointed by the government. Local police authorities decide on the operational plan, budget, internal organisation and rules of

149 Stuart Henry, *Private Justice: Towards Integrated Theorizing in the Sociology of Law* (London: Routledge, 1983)

150 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, eds., *Plural Policing in Comparative Policing* (London: Routledge, 2006, Rigakos, *The New Parapolice: Risk Markets and Commodified Social Control*, Clifford D. Shearing and Philip C. Stenning, „Reframing Policing,“ Pp. 9-18 *Private Policing*, eds. Clifford D. Shearing and Philip C. Stenning (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987).

151 Jean-Paul Brodeur, „High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks About the Policing of Political Activities,“ *Social Problems* 30.5 (1983): 507-2, Gary T. Marx, *Undercover: Police Surveillance in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)

152 Christian Parenti, *The Soft Cage. Surveillance in America: From Slave Passes to the War on Terror* (New York: Basic Books, 2003, Ian Loader and Neil Walker, *Civilizing Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

procedure. The chief commissioner has responsibility for the day-to-day operations and finances and ensures that operations are conducted effectively and in compliance with the law and that they are reported reliably and fairly. The local police board also has an assistive role.

The local police authorities are supervised by the National Police Board which is the central administrative agency for police services and reports to the Swedish Ministry of Justice. It is led by the National Police Commissioner and also features a governing board, all appointed by the government. The National Police Board also includes the National Criminal Police and the Swedish Security Service, which are agencies operating nationally with a special remit. The former's remit pertains to serious organised crime, police intelligence and border controls, while the latter is a state security and counter-terrorism agency, and in practice functions as an independent authority.

The National Police Board, as central administrative agency for police services, has certain powers over the police authorities. It is responsible for developing and specifying the targets and guidelines that the Swedish Parliament and the Government decide for police activities and communicating them to the entire police organisation. It is also tasked with distributing the funds allocated to the police by the Government. The tasks of the National Police Board also include supervision and coordination of police services and the development and diffusion of standards regarding tactics, methods and technology. However, the National Police Board has limited powers to intervene to operations or correct the performance of police authorities. It has the power to perform inspections and has a reporting role being responsible for the annual report, interim report and budget documentation. The governing board also decides on guidelines, for internal audit and regulations directed at individuals, municipalities and county councils.

Police recruitment and training are centralised in Sweden. Admission to the police service is subject to formal qualifications and successful specialised tests and training. The service different types of employment and salary structures and benefits are decided

by means of collective agreements at national and local level.¹⁵³

Transparency levels are regulated by the Freedom of Press Act, granting to every citizen access to police documentation upon request and on condition that secrecy rules do not apply. The matter is decided by the local authority. Police authorities are expected to keep good order of their records and organise their own archives for the storage of public documents. The police service is subject to judicial control, according to the general rule that citizens are able to appeal against decisions of a public authority and seek judicial remedy. Procedures exist for scrutiny involving the parliamentary ombudsmen and the chancellor of justice, who can receive and investigate complaints. However, these authorities cannot review or modify the decisions of another public authority or court.¹⁵⁴

Current proposals for police reform in Sweden are in favour of the creation of a unified police service in that country with a view to addressing disparities in the service. The creation of an independent review body with a remit to supervise both the police service and the security service is also being considered.¹⁵⁵

Case 2: France

France is often considered the main source for a modern model of policing. Since early as the 17th century a state-controlled centralised municipal police existed in Paris, along with archetypal military-style national police force, the Gendarmerie. Historically, the former has provided a model for the creation of centralised bureaucratic state police forces, while the latter has provided an example for the organisation of a police force key to the pacification of the countryside and state building. The

153 Swedish National Police Board, *The Swedish Police—an Introduction* (Stockholm: Swedish National Police Board)

154 Swedish Ministry of Justice, *The Swedish Judicial System—a Brief Presentation* (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice, 2012)

155 Swedish Ministry of Justice, *A Unified Swedish Police Service - Summary in English* (Stockholm: Ministry of Justice Police Organisation Committee, 2012)

Italian Carabinieri and the Spanish Guardia Civil are similar gendarmerie-type police forces.¹⁵⁶

At present, France features two state-controlled national police forces, the National Police whose remit is to provide a police service to towns with a population of 10,000 or more, and the Gendarmerie, who are responsible for the policing of smaller municipalities and of the countryside. The National Police is a civil police force answerable to the Minister of the Interior. The Gendarmerie, while formally constituting a military body and part of the French armed forces, is responsible to the Minister of Interior in matters of public order, to the Ministry of Justice for criminal investigations, and for all other purposes, to the Ministry of Defence. France also features numerous municipal police forces, operating in cities with a population of over 100,000 under the general police powers of the mayor. These three types of police in many cases coexist, since areas policed by the Gendarmerie have today become heavily urbanised, and municipal police forces operate in areas coming under the jurisdiction of the National Police.¹⁵⁷

From an organisational viewpoint, the organisation of French policing follows closely the structures of the French administrative system. The heads and other senior personnel of both forces throughout the organisation are appointed by the central governments, whereas at local level police activities are superintended by the prefects, who are also officials appointed by the government as central state representatives in territorial administrative units (departments), and operate alongside elected local government bodies. Overall the Minister of the Interior exercises operational control in matters of public order and this authority is cascaded locally through the prefects, even though the Gendarmerie's military hierarchical structure entails that prefect control is more direct over the National Police. Municipal police forces while accountable to the mayor and responsible for general police duties perform a largely ancillary role particularly in matters of criminal investigation as according to

the law they are required to immediately refer cases to either the National Police or the Gendarmerie. Police operations therefore are highly centralised around the two state police bodies.¹⁵⁸

Furthermore, a general distinction that applies to police activities in France is that between administrative police, pertaining to securing public order, including traffic and riot control, and judicial police, which includes criminal investigation, arrest powers and other related activity according to criminal procedure and under the supervision of the judiciary. The consequences of this distinction traverse the French police not merely operationally, but also as regards personnel, since special procedures are required for any police officer to achieve the status of a judicial police officer and therefore to exercise the powers vested in that status. This differentiation also defines the structure of training, career, conditions of work and even appearance, particularly in the National Police. Officers who do not possess judicial police status have limited powers in this respect, and constitute a special category of personnel. The same distinction also applies to the Gendarmerie but because this police force is organised along military lines and has retained a system of territorial presence by means of a large number of small units (brigades) which are dispersed throughout the country and perform all police duties, the division is less pronounced (e.g. all personnel is uniformed).¹⁵⁹

Overall, France presents the archetypal system of state-controlled policing under conditions of liberal democracy, as structures of police control and accountability are closely intertwined with the general structures of executive and judicial power. As a re-

156 Alan Williams, *The Police of Paris, 1718-1789* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979, Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*

157 Horton, C, *Policing policy in France*, (Policy Studies Institute, London, 1995).

158 Christine Horton, *Policing Policy in France* (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1995, Jacques de Maillard and Sebastian Roché, "Crime and Justice in France: Time Trends, Policies and Political Debate," *European Journal of Criminology* 1.1 (2004): 111-5, Jacqueline Hodgson, *French Criminal Justice. A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005, Frédéric Ocqueteau, "France," Pp. 55-76 *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (London: Routledge, 2006).

159 Horton, *Policing Policy in France*, Hodgson, *French Criminal Justice. A Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France*

sult, accountability is hierarchical and managerial, and largely dependent on legal redress retrospectively. A police union for the National Police exists but apart from giving a public representation to the moral and professional interests of its members, it is no formal part of police governance in that country.

Case 3: United Kingdom (England and Wales)

England is considered to offer a model of policing which is usually juxtaposed to the highly centralised state-controlled systems that have emerged and prevailed historically in continental Europe. It is true to some extent that early 19th century police reform in that country, conscious in its effort to eschew characteristics of continental European policing that were deemed undesirable in light of the English sociopolitical context, produced an archetypical civil police organisation in the form of the Metropolitan Police Service. The subsequent diffusion of this model across the country in the 19th century as a replacement of older structures has resulted in an configuration of the police institution which largely reflects local government structures while still permitting significant steering from the central government.¹⁶⁰ Policing in England and Wales (separate legal regimes apply to Scotland and N. Ireland) still consists today of 43 territorial police forces each covering a particular police area and each governed by a separate police authority. Nevertheless, national ‘special’ police forces and agencies exist in the UK today, and until recently a gendarmerie-style militarised police force had been responsible for Northern Ireland. In addition, the increasingly active role of the Home Office (the English Ministry of Interior) is considered to signify considerable centralising trends.

The police system that largely remains in place currently was established in 1964. It has been generally known as the ‘tripartite structure’, according to which the responsibilities for the operation of the police service are divided between the Home Office, local police authorities and chief constables. Under this general framework, the chief constable

is responsible for the direction and control of each force in operational matters, a local police authority has the responsibility for the general maintenance of the police force of its area, including the power to establish local policing objectives and to monitor police performance, while the Home Secretary has a general supervisory role as well as the general power to issue regulations regarding the government, administration and conditions of service of police forces.¹⁶¹

Before 2011, local police authorities were independent bodies of a mixed membership the majority of whom were representatives of the local government, while the composition of the remainder of their membership had varied—the original 1964 system included members of the local judiciary but over time the system shifted towards appointment of independent members. Local police authorities were abolished in 2011 and were replaced by officials directly elected for a four-year term, designated as Police and Crime Commissioners, and by new Police and Crime Panels, the majority of whose members is nominated by local government. Under this new regime, the local authority component retains the responsibility to establish a yearly police and crime plan regulating police and crime objectives, the allocation of financial and other resources and the monitoring of performance of the police, but the elected PCCs have a much more prominent and active role in the process. PCCs also have the power to appoint, suspend or request the resignation of the chief constable.¹⁶²

On the other hand, it is today a largely undisputed fact that the influence of the Home Secretary in police governance has increased considerably

161 Laurence Lustgarten, *The Governance of Police* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986)

162 The introduction of elected PCCs can be seen as resulting in a ‘quadripartite’ rather than ‘tripartite’ structure Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn and David J. Smith, “Democracy and Police and Crime Commissioners,” Pp. 219–44 *Policing: Politics, Culture and Control*, eds. Tim Newburn and Jill Peay (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), Stuart Lister, “The New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commissioners and the ‘Operational Independence’ of the Police,” *Policing: a journal of policy and practice* 7.3 (2013): 239–4, Tim Newburn, “Police and Crime Commissioners: The Americanisation of Policing or a Very British Reform?,” *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 40 (2012): 31–46

160 Philip Rawlings, *Policing: A Short History* (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2002)

over time.¹⁶³ The centralising trends are not visible merely by the exercise of central government powers to establish general objectives and performance targets, to issue codes of police practice and general regulations regarding personnel qualifications, duties or conditions of work, equipment standards, and not least to allocate central government funds to local police authorities. Rather this influence has increased over time through the consolidation or development of nationally relevant structures, such as the Audit commission or Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), ensuring external scrutiny of the police forces and therefore the diffusion of centrally set standards. Furthermore, a number of key policing areas, such as the suppression of serious and organised crime, border policing or cybercrime, have come under the remit of special bodies possessing national jurisdiction, particularly the National Crime Agency which has been given direct operational or cross-force coordination responsibilities. As instances of regional or cross-force coordination or cooperation have increased, there are also ongoing debates which are typically ignited by central government and regard the restructuring of the forces towards a smaller number of organisation covering larger areas and with a view to increasing operational capacity and efficiency.¹⁶⁴

Within this framework, chief constables retain the control for operational policing, including decisions regarding the day-to-day management of the organisation and operations, the appointment of senior staff within the respective organisations and so on. The internal unity and discipline of the uniformed element of the English police system is secured by special regulations that apply to the recruitment, training and career progression from the rank of constable up to the senior ranks. The organisational structure typically includes staff formations and support units for the entire organisation. The delivery of core police services and the interfacing of the police with local communities is performed by units

serving particular smaller geographical areas. While the operational independence of the uniformed element is largely undisputed along the above lines, there are aspects of the system that moderate this monopoly to some extent. Since the 1990s there has been a renewed emphasis on the local delivery of police services and continuous attempts to reinforce the relation of frontline policing with either local communities or local stakeholders by means of crime and disorder reduction partnerships or neighbourhood policing schemes. Related to this change has been the introduction of a new category of police personnel with limited powers, designated as Police Community Support Officers (PCSO), who are deployed in neighbourhood policing and are complementary of the core force. The English system also allows for a limited element of civilian participation in the form of Special Constables. These are volunteers who undertake to work with and support regular police officers for a few hours a week. Special Constables are uniformed and have the same powers as regular police officers. They are subject similar criteria for recruitment and similar rules of conduct and discipline as regular personnel.¹⁶⁵

There are two levels at which the accountability of the English police can be assessed. The above should have made sufficiently clear that external scrutiny of the police has intensified at a strategic level, since performance targets, objectives, strategies are increasingly set in consultation or collaboration with national or local bodies that are firmly embedded in the current institutional design of the system. There is also a number of stakeholders in the form of professional bodies or associations, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Police Federation, the British Association of Women in Policing, the National Black Police Association and so on, which also contribute to the shaping of policing policies. On the other hand, the primary means of regulating and controlling police activity remains judicial redress. There are however elements complementing this system by organising an independent complaints process. The body currently responsible is the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) that was introduced in

163 Barry Loveday and Anna Reid, *Going Local: Who Should Run Britain's Police* (London: Policy Exchange, 2003)

164 Rob C Mawby and Alan Wright, "The Police Organisation," Pp. 224–52 *Handbook of Policing*, ed. Tim Newburn, 2nd ed. (Cullompton: Willan, 2008).

165 Mawby and Wright, "The Police Organisation,"

2002. The IPCC has national jurisdiction and is able to oversee the handling of complaints by the police and also to investigate complaints independently. Under this system, police forces retain the responsibility to deal with the bulk of citizen complaints against their actions, but complaints or incidents involving deaths, serious injuries, assault and corruption must be referred to the IPCC. Additionally the IPCC take over an investigation when alleged police misconduct has raised serious public concerns. The IPCC has developed its own infrastructure and special personnel to perform its role.¹⁶⁶

Case 4: United States

A discussion of policing in the United States, albeit necessarily brief is almost mandatory for three reasons. Firstly, key developments in the organisation of the police have taken place in the US since the beginning of the twentieth century and there is an extremely developed body of thinking and research on policing; second, as the US rose to a hegemonic position in the international system in the post-WWII ear, it has influenced directly and indirectly the organisation of police forces around the world, and continues to do so today; and, thirdly, because crime and crime control has been a markedly politicised issue in the US, clear politically opposed ways of thinking have developed over time so that a robust, rich and creative progressive approach towards the police exists today.

The US police system appears to be markedly different from the centralised, single or dual police continental systems discussed so far. There is a multiplicity of organisations operating at the Federal, State and local levels and the vast majority of US police personnel is dispersed in almost 18,000 state, county and municipal police organisations which vary considerably in size and structure. The bulk of the police services to the population on a day-to-day basis is delivered by these organisations, as federal police organisations have a more limited remit being responsible for the investigation and control

of federal and interstate crime only. Jurisdictional overlaps are possible and common, given the fragmented nature of the system. Additionally, the production of security in the US includes a distinct and important private component, as private security is a growing business and personnel employed in private security clearly outnumber the public police.¹⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the paramilitarised bureaucratic police organisation that is typical of other contexts in not by any means foreign to the US. The militarised police bureaucracy emerged in the beginning of the 20th century as a compelling model for addressing the issues of corruption and manipulation by local politics that had been pervasive in US policing due to its fragmented and decentralised outlook. While police organisations have remained closely tied to the local communities they police, the idea of a paramilitary bureaucracy has been heavily entrenched in the notion of police professionalism that has prevailed in the US. Police reformers sought to centralise police administration so as to neutralise external influences, define better the mission of the police and improve personnel standards, as well as the delivery of the police service on the basis of bureaucratic control, specialisation and technological advances. Militarism and bureaucratism were also at the heart of the system's response to the perceived crisis of legitimation in the 1960s, which the social movements of the era engendered. Increased police numbers, an emphasis on selection and training, the development of highly paramilitarized units, the deployment of advanced technological means were trends underpinned by the prevailing notion of police professionalism. The entrenchment of this model was also reinforced by more robust steering at the federal level through the work of agencies such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEEA) or the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies.¹⁶⁸

While innovation has occurred mostly within the above professional policing framework, after the

¹⁶⁶ Trevor Jones, "The Accountability of Policing," Pp. 693–724 *Handbook of Policing*, ed. Tim Newburn, 2nd ed. (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2008), Lister, "The New Politics of the Police: Police and Crime Commissioners and the 'Operational Independence' of the Police,"

¹⁶⁷ Peter K. Manning, "The United States of America," Pp. 98–125 *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (London: Routledge, 2006).

¹⁶⁸ Manning, "The United States of America," , Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Police Organisation in the Twentieth Century," *Crime and Justice* 15 Modern policing (1992): 51–9, Larry K. Gaines and Victor E. Kappeler, *Policing in America*, 7th ed. ed. (Newark, NJ: Lexis Nexis : Anderson Pub., 2011)

1980s a community and problem-oriented policing model, emphasising closer ties with the community and a tailored policing approach, has gained ascendancy. A significant number of police organisations have explored and introduced elements of this strategy, which assigns greater discretion to front-line personnel to work with the community, features a partnership philosophy and espouses higher levels of transparency and accountability at the expense of hierarchical control and traditional crime control methods. Considerable experience and a significant volume of research has emerged from this trend and we shall return to the possibilities opened up by this model in the final section of this essay.¹⁶⁹ However, in the post-9/11 era a renewed emphasis on state security and counterterrorism affecting the US police system in its entirety has signified a regression to more traditional mentalities in the implementation of police strategies.

Along the above lines, US police organisations vary in size, structure and methods but are typically hierarchical, featuring a unified chain of command and a military style rank structure. The military model is particularly visible in the highly specialised outlook and methods of SWAT (Special Weapons And Tactics) and other special response units which have proliferated since the late 1980s.¹⁷⁰ While recruitment procedures have become more stringent and more dependent on prior qualifications and considerable emphasis has been given on initial training over time, US police organisations constitute a largely closed system and the staffing of higher ranks is achieved predominantly by selection from serving personnel.¹⁷¹ Police chiefs also predominantly come from the police ranks within the department, but lateral entry is also possible.

In the municipal departments, which constitute the majority of police organisations in the US, hiring is controlled by city government and chiefs typically report directly to the mayor or council. As regards conditions of pay and work, it is often the case at the state and local level that police personnel are able to bargain collectively, even though some policy areas are excluded from the process. Police unionisation has made progress since the 1960s but representation is fragmented and there is no national police union in the US.¹⁷²

Police accountability is an important and highly politicised issue in the United States. Although the professional model is explicitly and highly prescriptive about police ethical conduct, the progressive insularity and prevailing mentalities in US police organisations have been responsible for significant biases in the delivery of police work up to the point of engendering considerable strain in the relations between police and the public. The professional model typically espouses a great degree of autonomy for the police and the use of internal administrative procedures for the control of the police forces on the basis of written rules and regulations, but this model is considered responsible for considerable failures in many critical issue areas, such as the use of force, respect of human rights and so on. Scrutiny of US police practices has relied heavily on judicial recourse, via constitutional, tort and criminal law, and some landmark decisions of the US Supreme Court laying down fundamental rules for police procedures, such as *Mapp v Ohio* and *Miranda v Arizona*¹⁷³ are well known well beyond outside the US. External control of US police organisation some time involves ad hoc inquiries typically following incidents causing significant public concern, and increasingly since the 1980s the creation of independent 'civilian' agencies with a remit to review and investigate citizen complaints. The demand for meaningful ways to audit the police externally has been a direct consequence of the politicisation of the issue of police accountability, particularly by the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Political

169 Wesley G Skogan and Susan M Hartnett, *Community Policing, Chicago Style* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Victor E. Kappeler and Larry K. Gaines, *Community Policing : A Contemporary Perspective*, 6th ed. ed. (Amsterdam ; Boston, Waltham, MA: Elsevier Anderson Pub., 2011), Michael. Palmiotto, *Community Policing: A Police-Citizen Partnership* (New York: Routledge, 2011)

170 Kraska and Kappeler, „*Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units*,“, Peter B Kraska, ed., *Militarising the American Criminal Justice System: The Changing Roles of the Armed Forces and the Police* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2001)

171 Carol A Archbold, *Policing: A Text/Reader* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2013)

172 Gene L. Scaramella, Steven M. Cox and William McCamey, *Introduction to Policing* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2011)

173 *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

pressure has resulted in a rather synergistic system of pursuing higher standards of accountability, in which the traditional methods are complemented by more intensive—retrospective as well as proactive—monitoring of activity by the police departments on one hand, and, increasingly, forms of citizen oversight.¹⁷⁴

Comparative policing themes

Our brief survey suggests that, even though police systems invariably gravitate towards the modern institutional forms underpinned by bureaucracy and juridicopolitical ideology, history and the particularities of national contexts weigh heavily on their outlook. The latter is a concrete expression of how social and political struggles impact the articulation of the hegemonic security apparatus in each capitalist society. These characteristics define the general margins for the subsequent development of those systems and also for the nature and direction of police reform within the established sociopolitical regime. Within these margins, it is possible to conclude that certain configurations are more conducive to reform in a progressive direction, precisely because their elements are more accessible (or amenable) to social and political struggles of subordinate populations.

While change in centralised and heavily bureaucratised systems is slow and often more responsive to the needs of the state than to the needs of citizens, decentralised systems featuring local control of the police service offer more possibilities for further and substantive democratisation, as they present a degree of flexibility and openness to experimentation with new approaches to organisation and oversight. The cases of France and Greece (discussed elsewhere in this Report) are indicative of how organisational change is driven primarily by internal forces leading to the refinement of the repressive capabilities of the police. Institutional change enables higher levels of responsiveness and accountability but this has failed to gather pace.

It is the case that more decentralised models permit greater openness to reform, particularly

when questions of policing become politicised. In England and Wales the introduction of elected police and crime commissioners has been a response to the intense politicisation of questions of law and order and, theoretically, an evolutionary step within a system featuring high levels of local control and accountability. The politicisation of policing in the United States continually since the 1960s has engendered higher levels of scrutiny as well as the move towards community policing, which, at least theoretically, espouses police decentralisation, de-bureaucratisation and community involvement. Such developments present opportunities both for further democratic reform or for a strategic re-adaptation of the repressive apparatus,¹⁷⁵ as the role and organisation of policing become politically contested issues to be resolved by political means. Any democratization must be substantive and penetrative of institutions of policing.

It is unfortunate that the Left, particularly in societies featuring heavily centralised state police, has barricaded itself behind an instrumentalist view of the police and has thus eschewed the task of developing a detailed programme on the question of security as a public good to which every citizen is entitled. It is true that the Left's constant exposure to the iron hand of the police cannot but dictate a radical and possibly unreflexive oppositional stance. However, the politicisation of security depends not on reactive protest alone, but on whether questions of policing and its delivery are embraced and fought out by wider social alliances, social movements and more generally the people whose lives are typically more exposed to the reactionary effects of police paramilitarism and bureaucracy. If the Left is to develop a strategy for intervention into these important fields of struggle, then it must reappraise its theoretical understanding of the question of security and study the characteristics of the production of security by the contemporary police organisation, its social composition, the division of labour within it and so on. The strategic direction towards which the Left should pursue police reform is the radical decentralisation of the governance and the organisation of the existing police service, but deciding

174 Manning, "The United States of America," Samuel Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight* (London: Wadsworth, 2001)

175 S Herbert, 'Policing the contemporary city: fixing broken windows or shoring up neo-liberalism', *Theoretical Criminology* vol. 5, no. 4, 2001, pp. 445-466.

what the particular steps in that direction can be will heavily depend on a clearer understanding of the contradictions residing in the police apparatus and on how they can be activated as issues to be resolved in the political arena.



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